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Introduction
Three young men enter a shopping mall.  In a security office in the mall a guard monitors 
them via closed circuit TV.  Based upon their appearance (i.e their ethnicity, the way they are 
dressed etc.) he decides to approach them and asks for ID.  They are told that if they do not produce 
ID, they will not be admitted.  He then runs their names through the computer and finds that one of 
them was arrested two years before on a shop lifting charge.  He tells all three they must leave. 
This not uncommon scenario raises nettlesome issues regarding the general right of the mall 
owner to exclude versus the right of the young men to visit the mall, as well as whether the 
exclusion was based upon factors, such as race, age or ethnicity, that many would find at minimum 
troubling and perhaps entirely unacceptable.1 The owner of the shopping mall would likely claim 
that he need not explain his or her reasons for excluding these men because the mall is private 
property and as the owner retains discretion to exclude anyone for any reason or no reason at all.  
The young men might counter that the shopping mall is effectively a public space since it is the only 
place in the vicinity that offers any shopping, entertainment, services and dining and has replaced 
the local downtown as the primary place to walk around and interact with others in the vicinity.  
They might also assert that the mall owner’s criteria for exclusion included illegitimate factors such 
as the young men’s age, race or ethnicity.  This type of scenario has resulted in a lively scholarly 
debate as well as a fair amount of litigation.2
1 See, e.g., Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black, Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to the Cases of Consumer Racial 
Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2003); Joesph Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and 
Private Property, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 1283 (1996); Patricia J. Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse 
of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 127 (1987); Amy Benfer, ”Policing Gangsta 
Fashion” Salon (May 29, 2002);  Judith Evans, “Eddie Bauer’s Tarnished Local Image: As Its Fashions Become 
Popular with Urban Youth, Retailer Deals with the Fallout of P.G., Incident, Wash. Post (Dec. 30, 1995); Courtland 
Milloy “Teen Stripped of More than Just a Shirt” Wash. Post (Nov. 15, 1995). 
 
2 See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch & Clifford Shearing, Exclusion from Public Space, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 77, 79, 86 (Andrew von Hirsch, David Garland & Alison 
Wakefield eds.  2001) (“[I]t suffices that we treat as public in character those spaces that clearly are designed for 
general public use, such as a large downtown shopping mall replacing a traditional shopping area.);  Singer, supra note 
2 at 1291 (“Both public perception and fundamental legal principles today suggest that businesses open to the public 
have a duty to serve the public without unjust discrimination. Yet the formal law does not unequivocally reflect this 
principle. I will argue here that the formal law should reflect the settled social consensus behind this principle, and that, 
in order to do so, the common-law rule that grants most businesses the right to exclude customers at will must be 
changed.”);  Richard Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robbins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
21, 24 (1997)  (“The power of government to regulate and to take is closely tied to the correlative rights and duties of 
ordinary individuals as regulated and determined in common law adjudication.  This position does not require us to 
pretend that each and every common law decision is part of some seamless intellectual web. Obviously, some strong 
differences of opinion persist regarding the application of general common law principles to particular cases or even 
entire classes of problems.”); Sarah G. Vincent, The Cultural Context of the Shopping Mall: Tension between Patron’s 
Right of Access & Owner’s Right to Exclude, 37 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 221, 222 (2004) (“Which is more important: a 
protester's First Amendment rights or a private property owner's right to exclude? There are a series of shopping mall 
cases in which the courts decide whether or not protestors can use shopping malls to disseminate information to the 
public against private property owners' wishes. I want to use the shopping mall as an example of how new forms of 
private property were addressed by the courts and whether or not that resolution was satisfactory. I believe we can learn 
from the shopping mall cases so we do not repeat the same mistakes in future controversies involving new forms of 
property…Then there is a disagreement between the people who use the space and those who created it. A question 
arises: who resolves this disagreement? May an owner make up the rules after the game has started or are the rules 
implicit in the way that the owner invites people to play the game and how the people have begun to play it?”); 
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The technique used to exclude these men is often referred to as situational crime prevention 
(SCP) and shopping malls fall into a class of property called mass private space.3 The extent and 
manner of states’ regulation of owners of mass private property (e.g shopping malls and amusement 
parks) in their employment of situational crime prevention (“SCP”) (e.g. exclusion of certain 
groups, surveillance with video cameras) challenges traditional notions of property law and the 
states’ exercise of police power.  The de jure private status of the property supports the argument 
that owner should be free to employ whatever methods of SCP (short of criminal acts such as 
assault and false imprisonment) that the owner deems to be in his or her self interest4; the de facto 
public nature of the property, however, counsels in favor of allowing the state to regulate the actions 
that the owner takes on the property vis-à-vis members (such as excluding those who fit a certain 
profile) pursuant to the state’s inherent police power.5 Although courts and commentators have 
grappled with the issue of the extent to which the owners of shopping malls and the like should be 
able to employ exclusion, surveillance or other tactics to reduce crime or other undesirable activities 
as a matter of their own prerogative, free from legislative or judicial interference,  there has been 
little consensus.6
The current article puts forth two main critiques with regard to the current approach and 
through such critique provides an alternative approach.  First, it posits that current scholarship and 
doctrine errs by treating mass private property either as if it were the same as other private property 
or as if it were public space, thus ignoring the dual nature of mass private property as being both 
public and private.7 Second, this article argues that most cases and articles that have addressed the 
issue of SCP by owners of mass private property, ignore the role that such properties play in a given 
community, analyzing the issue as if the property existed in a vacuum, divorced from the city, 
neighborhood or area in which it is located and the role that a given property plays in a particular 
locale (what will hereinafter be referred to as the community contingent nature of mass private 
 
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) (“Logan Valley 
Mall is the functional equivalent of a ‘business block’  and. . . must be treated in substantially the same manner.”); State 
v. Schmid 423 A.2d 615, 628 (NJ 1980) (effectively treating mass private space as public for free speech purposes; N.J. 
Coalition Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760 (NJ 1994) (same); Citizens for 
Ethical Government, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assoc., L.P., 260 Ga. 245, 246 (GA 1990). (“The property at issue here is a 
privately owned and operated shopping mall that is generally open to the public for shopping, dining and entertainment. 
Since the mall's opening, its owners have enforced a policy prohibiting all solicitation and political activity in the mall. 
The policy has been applied uniformly to all persons and organizations without regard to the content or format. We hold 
that nothing in the Georgia Constitution or the Recall Act of 1989, either separately or together, establishes a right of 
private citizens to enter onto such property to solicit signatures for a recall petition.”). 
 
3 These terms will be more formally defined in section I of this article 
 
4 Epstein, supra note 2, at 24. 
5 See Pruneyard Shopping Cntr. v. Robins 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (”It is, of course, well established that a state in the 
exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property . . . . “); Singer, supra note 2, at 1291. 
 
6 Compare Epstein supra note 2 (arguing that “it is difficult to conceive of any property as private if the right to 
exclude is rejected” with Singer, supra note 2 (asserting that “the common-law rule that grants most businesses the right 
to exclude at will must be changed.”;  see also Prueyard, 447 U.S at  81; Lucia Zedner, Too Much Security, INT. J. OF 
THE SOC. OF LAW (2003); Jennifer Klear, Comparison of the Federal Courts’ and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
Treatment of Free Speech on Private Property: Where Won’t We Have the Freedom to Speak Next?, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 
589 (2002).  
 
7 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 2; Epstein, supra note 2; von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2; section III, infra.
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property).  In so doing, these cases and articles fail to recognize that the manner in which SCP is to 
be regulated (if at all) should depend not only upon the nature of the property itself but the 
characteristics of the setting wherein the property is located, which necessarily has a two-way 
symbiotic relationship with the property.8 In response to the failure of current scholarship and case 
law with regard to the above issues, the instant article seeks to establish a framework for regulating 
SCP in mass private property that incorporates both the dual nature of mass private property and 
community contingency.    
Section I defines mass private property and SCP with some more detail and examples than 
the rather general description put forth here in the introduction.  Section II summarizes some 
prominent literature and case law that seeks to address the conundrum posed by SCP in mass 
private property.  Section III discusses the dual nature of mass property, as both private property 
and as public milieu, and posits that the private and public features of mass private property are 
separate aspects and that, however challenging, the best approach to regulating SCP on such 
property lies in recognizing and taking account of each of these characteristics.   
Section IV discusses the contingent nature of mass private property, asserting that such 
spaces play different roles in different communities.  Because the meaning of community is a 
contested concept, the section opens with a discussion of some arguments put forth about the 
meaning of “community.”  This article does not seek to resolve the problem of defining community 
for all purposes, but, less ambitiously, seek to provide a provisional definition of community that is 
sufficient for the purposes for evaluating the role of a particular mass private space in a given 
community.  The relationship between community and regulation of mass private property is two-
fold.  First, the type of SCP that is acceptable is partly a function of the role that a given mass 
private property plays in a community.  Second, the degree of freedom that an owner of such 
property has to regulate conduct in his or her space raises questions regarding the values of the 
community in which it is situated.  Just as punishment, among other things, expresses the values of 
the society that undertakes the punishment,9 the forms of SCP that a community allows or prohibits 
in mass private space is also expressive of community values since such space plays a public role in 
the community.10 For this reason, this paper asserts that the community wherein the mass private 
 
8 James Bernard Murphy, Equality in Exchange, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 85, 113 (2002) (“Both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas 
understand property ownership as a kind of trust: civil law permits private ownership on the condition that it serve the 
common good of the community. Each property owner is a kind of trustee who has a duty of justice to ensure that his 
property meets the needs of his fellow citizens. According to the principle of subsidiarity implicit in their thought, it 
would be unjust for the government to claim sole responsibility for distributive justice, for this would deny individuals 
and communities the right to exercise their best judgment and creative initiative in deciding how their wealth could best 
serve the common good.”). 
 
9 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY 79-80 (1960) (“In modern societies, in contrast, with moral 
values that celebrate individual freedom and rationality, acts that violate the moral order do not produce as strong a 
demand for punishment and punishments reflect those values by emphasizing the humanity of even the offender.”);  
Ronald J. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment,
65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 306 (1990) (“The law-abiding public, through its legislatures, has structured the criminal law 
system to reflect its values and beliefs.”).  
 
10 See  Mark C. Alexander, Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern Shopping Mall, 1999 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 1, 2 (1999) (“Countless Americans practically live their lives in the modern mall. . .  . In the late 1960s and the 
1970s, the shopping mall had already developed into a significant American institution, but in the intervening decades, 
malls like the Mall of America in Minnesota, the Sawgrass Mills mall in Florida and many others have literally and 
figuratively redefined the American landscape.”). 
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space is located should, within certain boundaries, be given broad leeway to regulate SCP in such 
space. 
Section V sets forth a framework for regulating SCP in mass private property that is rooted 
in both the dual public/private nature of mass private property discussed in  
Section III, and the argument put forth in Section IV that the role that a private space plays in a 
given community is geographically and demographically variable, and that regulating SCP in mass 
private property is an important means by which a community can express itself.  In sum, Section V 
argues that the dual public/private nature of mass private property imposes substantive boundaries 
upon the community, on one hand, delineating a zone of protection for mass private property 
owners by providing some limit on the community’s putting restrictions upon the SCP measures the 
owner may employ, and on the other hand providing a limit as to the SCP measures that a mass 
private property owner may implement, even if authorized to do so by the community.  Within these 
boundaries, the community should (with some exceptions discussed in Section V) be the arbiter of 
which SCP measures the owner may employ. 
I. Mass Private Property and Situational Crime Control Defined
A. Mass Private Property
Mass private property is a “term coined by Shearing and Stenning to describe large, 
privately-controlled tracts of property.”11 Although originally discussed primarily in non-US 
sources, the term has now frequently been used in American scholarly literature.12 It is sometimes 
called “mass private space,” “semi-public space,” or “quasi-public space.”  To understand what 
constitutes mass private property, it is important to realize that the term refers not only to the size of 
the property, but also to its use: it “performs the function of public space.”13 
The paradigmatic mass private property is the large shopping mall that contains retail stores, 
restaurants, theaters and other entertainment centers, as well as common areas that people often 
frequent or walk around much like they would in an urban shopping district.14 However, there is no 
 
11 Alison Wakefield, Situational Crime Prevention in Mass Private Property, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 125 n. 1;  see also von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86.  
 
12 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 591 (2005) (“The term 
“mass private property” coined by Shearing and Stenning, refers to large, privately owned spaces like shopping malls, 
gated communities, and commercial and industrial “campuses” that depend upon public use.”). 
 
13 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (“The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for 
use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of 
those who use it.”); see also Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. 74 (holding that California’s requiring a shopping 
mall to allow expressive activity in the mall was not a taking within the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment given the nature of the activity in relation to the primary purpose to which the owner of the mall had put 
the property). 
 
14 Wakefield, supra note 11, at 125; see also Curtis J. Berger, PruneYard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 
66 N.Y.U.L. REV. 633, 656 (1991) (“Where it is important legally to distinguish between private and public space, as 
must be done in the search for a public forum, one should look beyond the property's title, focusing instead on its 
physical layout, its ongoing activity, and the occupants' reasonable expectations. Political discourse naturally 
complements the medley of ongoing activity within the marketplace. As the American city evolved, the market 
expanded into the streets and sidewalks of the central business district. More recently, as suburban America developed, 
the privately owned mall has transformed the marketplace once again. Each stage of evolution, from a discrete public 
marketplace to the expanded central business district to the privately owned mall, has embodied attributes that well suit 
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precise line demarcating the boundary between mass private space and other forms of private 
property, the matter being a matter of degree as well as a dynamic concept that continues to 
evolve.15 Perhaps the best way to determine what one should consider to be mass private property 
is the degree to which the property resembles and function as public space.16 So while the large 
shopping mall is the paradigm, mass private property might included such spaces as “an arts centre. 
. .with visual and performing arts and licensed refreshment facilities” and a large shopping center 
that consisted mainly of retail shops but did not contain all the entities that one might find in a 
shopping mall, such as cinemas, restaurants or other entertainment facilities.17 
The key distinguishing feature is that the private property is open to the public for multiple 
uses and even for no particular use.  Thus, many users of mass private property will go there to 
simply walk around or to socialize and not necessary to purchase anything.18 Moreover, generally 
the owners/operators of such properties allow people to access these spaces without requiring them 
to purchase anything. 
 Thus, mass private spaces are distinguishable from other private spaces that are open to the 
public for a particular use, such as shops, restaurants and cinemas.19 The public can generally enter 
 
the forum role. Thus, it seems natural to define the modern public forum not in terms of ownership but rather as a 
gathering place . . . .”).   
15 See Berger, supra note 14, at 656. 
 
16 See Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86; see also New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. 
J.M.B Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 781 (N.J. 1994) (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 581, n. 5 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting)) (“We realize there may be differences of degree and that some cases might approach a closeness that 
would otherwise give us pause. Similar concerns apparently infused the debate among Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court on these issues. Addressing precisely the same concerns expressed by defendants, Justice Marshall said: 
‘Every member of the Court was acutely aware [in Logan] that we were dealing with degrees, not absolutes. But we 
found that degrees of difference can be of constitutional dimension.’  Despite the degrees, the entity to which we apply 
the free speech right, the regional shopping center, is clearly and easily discernible and distinguishable from all others in 
its constitutional satisfaction of the standard of Schmid; it is distinguishable in its physical size, its multitude of uses, its 
layout, and its combination of characteristics that together compel the imposition of the constitutional obligation.”). 
 
17 Wakefield, supra note 11, at 125;  see also von Hirsch and Shearing, supra note 2, at 86 (“At one end of the spectrum 
lie facilities that are primarily designed for specific uses—say, a small atrium in front of a few shops, meant for the 
convenience of customers but not for general use.  At the other end, is the large shopping mall which contains numerous 
retail outlets, restaurants, recreational facilities, and parking spaces—and which is meant for general public use.”); 
Brian Libby, Shopping Around for Second Lives, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, (2003) (“[M]alls gather a variety of goods 
into a central cluster [and] to have an ongoing life: malls need to take on more uses: social services, housing, religious 
institutions.” (internal quotes omitted)).   
 
18 See von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86 (discussing the stereotype of teenagers spending leisure time at the 
mall is an example of the “no particular use” aspect of such property); M. Neil Browne, Virginia Morrison & Kara Jo 
Jennings, The Role of Ethics in Regulatory Discourse: Can Market Failure Justify the Regulation of Casino Gambling?,
78 NEB. L. REV. 37, 62 (1999) (“Also alarming is that young adults are spending more time in malls than any prior 
generation.  Dr. James Roberts, assistant professor of marketing at Baylor University, comments that shopping centers 
are becoming hangout places where adolescents seek entertainment and socialization among friends.”); Jerry Kang & 
Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 93, 131 (2005) (“In addition 
to the manifest function of a shopping mall--namely shopping--the mall serves myriad latent functions, ranging from 
adolescent socializing to senior citizen physical exercise. As any urban teenager can testify, the mall is a prime site for 
dating, hanging out, and meeting new friends.”); Vincent, supra note 2, at 221 (“The shopping mall is the cathedral of 
contemporary culture.  It is the focus of what little social life many of us share with others.”). 
 
19 Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86 (“[T]he mass private property concept identifies a change in the structure 
of modern life—where and how Americans live, work, and spend leisure time—that has led to a more prominent role 
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such places but only for a particular use and a limited time.  Certainly some shops allow people to 
browse for various periods of time, and department stores are probably on the border of what might 
be considered mass private space, as they often have many departments and are set up to encourage 
people to wander from department to department.20 
For the purposes of the framework put forth here it is not necessary to delineate the exact 
line that demarcates mass private property and other private property, and locating the exact point at 
which private space has sufficient public use to qualify as mass private property would be difficult 
if not impossible.21 For this analysis, what I wish to convey is a sense of the type of properties that 
qualify as mass private space.  Moreover, for purposes of the framework I propose, one can assume 
that the property in question is at the end of the spectrum closest to public property, such as a mall 
with shops, restaurants, services, entertainment facilities and other attributes that one would find in 
a typical public commercial district, because such property raises the most difficult issues as regards 
SCP.  By providing an analysis with reference primarily to such property (although with some 
degree of acknowledgement of “less massive” and “less public” mass private space), this article 
develops a framework applicable to various types of mass private space. 
 
B. Situational Crime Prevention
Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) is a term most associated with the British criminologist 
Ronald Clarke, who notes that while SCP “has come to mean differing things . . . .[I]n its broad[est] 
meaning, it encompasses any attempt to manipulate the environment to reduce opportunities for 
crime.”22 Like mass private property, the concept and terminology has made its way into American 
scholarship.23 Less abstractly, SCP (sometimes referred to as primary crime prevention or 
 
for private police.”); Elizabeth Joh, Criminal Law: The Paradox of Private Policing 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 
63-64. 
 
20 Additionally, there are some places that charge admission that might be considered mass private space, such as 
amusement parks.  The analysis in this paper will focus on mass private property that one may enter free of charge.  
Nonetheless, to the extent that a property that charges an entry fee has aspects of mass private property, my analysis 
applies.   
 
21 Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86.  Richard Epstein picks up on this problem, suggesting that the point at 
which private property becomes subject to public considerations is marked not by any quality inherent in the property 
itself, but rather in the way a particular court is going to evaluate it.  Epstein supra note 2, at 34-35.  Furthermore, 
Michael Heller notes that “[p]rivate property is a complicated idea to pin down precisely, as its boundaries fray at the 
edges.”  Michael A. Heller, Critical Approaches to Property Institutions: Three Faces of Private Property, 79 Or. L. 
Rev. 417, 418 (2000). 
22 Ronald Clarke, Situation Prevention, Criminology and Social Values, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 97, 99.  
 
23 See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 N.W. L. REV. 655, 662 
(2006) (“Situational Crime Prevention (‘SCP’) arose out of a growing realization in the 1970s and 1980s that changes in 
policing and punishment were failing to reduce crime levels.”); Richard H. Schneider, American Anti-Terrorism 
Planning and Design Strategies: Applications for Florida Growth Management, Comprehensive Planning and Urban 
Design, 15 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y., 129, 138 (2003) (“Articulated by Ronald V. Clarke from ideas developed while he 
was at the British home office in the 1960s and early 1970s, situational crime prevention suggests that effective crime 
prevention depends upon opportunity reduction. This can be accomplished by increasing the perpetrator's risk of being 
seen or apprehended, by increasing the effort required to commit a criminal act, or by decreasing the rewards of the act. 
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reduction) describes steps taken to prevent (or more realistically reduce) crime before it occurs by 
reducing opportunities.24 This stands in contrast to traditional crime control, which seeks to reduce 
crime through the deterrent and incapacitating effects of punishment, or by addressing the social 
and economic causes of crime.25 
SCP includes measures such as designing cars with steering locks and closing off roads in 
high crime areas to make it harder for potential offenders to get into and out of such areas.26 It also 
includes providing better street lighting at night, outfitting merchandise with tags that trigger an 
alarm if one tries to remove the item from a shop without paying, and the installation of CCTV 
cameras in shops or in public places.27 Some SCP comes in the form of advice to individuals to 
take certain steps to reduce their risks of being crime victims, such as not walking alone at night or 
avoiding certain neighborhoods.28 
To foreshadow an issue that will be addressed in subsequent sections, SCP involves both an 
objective element (reducing crime) and a subjective one (making people feel safer), which may not 
be directly correlated with each other.29 In fact, as Zedner has argued, some SCP measures that 
seek to reduce crime may increase people’s anxiety about crime by raising their awareness of risk.30 
According to the theory, any one of these factors may be sufficient in and of themselves to deter or prevent criminal (or, 
by extension, terrorist) acts.”).   
 
24 See Ken Pease, Crime Reduction, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 947, 950 (Mike Maguire, Rod 
Morgan & Robert Reiner eds., 2002).  
 
25 See id. at 948-49. 
 
26 See R. A. Duff & S. E. Marshall, Benefits, Burdens and Responsibilities: Some Ethical Dimensions of Situational 
Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 17; see also Cheng, 
supra note 23, at 662 (citing steel mailboxes as an example of SCP in that the design of the box itself encourages a 
default pattern of behavior in which people do not steal mail); Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims 
and Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1454 (Oct. 1999) (“For example, studies have found that the 
presence of two cashiers greatly reduced the incidence of convenience store robberies. In some cases, even simple 
measures such as increased exterior lighting have been effective in reducing crime and the fear of crime in particular 
areas.”). 
 
27 See Pease, supra note 24, at 953; Martha J. Smith and Ronald V. Clarke, Crime and Public Transport, 27 CRIME &
JUST. 169, 171 (2000) (“Increased supervision would deter many offenders anxious to avoid detection and arrest. This 
can be accomplished through the use of more conductors and station staff, and by the provision of closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) surveillance.”). 
 
28 See Duff & Marshall, supra note 23, at 27, 31; Allison West, Tougher Prosecution When the Rapist is not a Stranger: 
Suggested Reform to the California Penal Code, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 169, 179 (Spring 1994) (“The fear of rape 
has been described as one that "most women experience . . . a nagging, gnawing sense that something awful could 
happen, an angst that keeps them from doing things they want or need to do, or from doing them at the time or in the 
way they might otherwise do."  Women share this fear in many unspoken ways: looking in the back seat of a car before 
entering alone, avoiding walking alone on a dark street, and checking out the surroundings when going somewhere 
new.”). 
 
29 See Zedner, supra note 6, at 15; Wendy Holloway & Tony Jefferson, The Role of Anxiety in Fear of Crime, in CRIME,
RISK AND INSECURITY 31 (Tim Hope & Richard Sparks eds., 2000); compare David Weisburd and John Eck, What Can 
Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?, 593 ANNALS 42, 56 (May 2004) (“Evidence of the effectiveness of 
situational and opportunity-blocking strategies, while not necessarily police based, provides indirect support for the 
effectiveness of problem solving in reducing crime and disorder.”), with Smith and Clarke, supra note 27, at 204-05 
(2000) (“Those responsible for security on public transportation systems can be seen as having two principal goals: to 
make the system as safe as possible by reducing levels of crime and to make passengers feel safer when riding their 
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As regards mass private property, the two primary SCP issues with which the instant article 
is are: (1) exclusion from such spaces; (2) behavioral standards.  In a sense these are just different 
flavors of the same strategy.  Exclusion is often based on behavior in which one has previously 
engaged at the property in question.31 And behavioral standards are generally enforced by 
removing (and thereby excluding at least temporarily) those who refuse to abide by the behavioral 
standards.32 
SCP in mass private property may involve several types of exclusion and behavioral 
standards.  Exclusion from a space may be “permanent or of substantial duration,”33 or the 
exclusion may be brief, such as asking someone who has behaved in a way unacceptable to the 
owner/operator to leave the premises and not return for the rest of the day or until he ceases 
“engaging in the behavior.”34 
systems. Several studies have found that fear of crime is related to personal and vicarious experience of crime or to 
feelings of personal vulnerability . . . . It might seem therefore that achieving the first goal would help achieve the 
second. However, as in other environments, the relationship between actual safety and fear of crime on public transport 
is not always direct.”). 
 
30 See id. 
31 See Wakefield, supra note 11, at 132-33; von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 92; Gregory Magarian, The First 
Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 101, 121 (November 2004) (“During the campaign against international terrorism, numerous property 
owners of this sort have clamped down on political debate, barring critics of government policies from channels of 
expression opened by their own invitations for the public to use their property.  The most emblematic incidents involved 
the expulsion of lone, peaceful protesters from spaces frequented by the public. Stephen Downs's arrest at the 
Crossgates Mall followed an incident a few months earlier in which the same mall had called the police to expel several 
local peace activists who had taped antiwar messages to their clothing and entered the mall.”). 
 
32 See id. at 132;  See also IRA G. ZEPP, JR. THE NEW RELIGIOUS IMAGE OF URBAN AMERICA: THE SHOPPING MALL AS 
CEREMONIAL CENTER 171 (1986) (“When the number of teens reaches critical mass and their behavior, especially 
excessive noise and the blocking of store entrances, has reached unacceptable levels, security is called.  At the extreme, 
security personnel or police will ban the young perpetrators from the mall.  For many teenagers, to be shunned by the 
mall and thereby isolated from their peers is a fate worse than death.  This has proved to be an effective deterrent.”); 
Skirt Stake, MIAMI NEW TIMES, August 4, 2005 (“Although tight, revealing garb and Burberry tams are venerated as 
South Florida cultural standards, Lior Gonda, a Web designer from Weston, was asked to leave a popular mall because 
he was wearing a demure floor-dusting skirt.”); Amy Benfer, Policing Gangsta Fashion, May 24, 2006, 
http://dir.salon.com/story/mwt/feature/2002/05/29/nelly/index.html  (“In late April, the rap star Nelly entered the Union 
Station Mall in his hometown of St. Louis to purchase 20 Cardinals jerseys for a video he was shooting at Busch 
stadium. Nelly (given name, Cornelius Haynes Jr.) is a local celebrity whose presence is usually welcomed. But on this 
day he was asked to leave by the Union Station security staff. The reason? He was wearing a do-rag, which is explicitly 
prohibited under the Union Station dress code as an item of "commonly known gang-related paraphernalia"—a category 
the mall defines as "including, but not limited to: wearing or showing a bandana or do rag of any color, a hat tilted or 
turned to the side, a single sleeve or pant leg pulled/rolled up and flashing gang signs . . . . But in this mall, as in many 
others across America, one doesn't have to be a gang member to be evicted under anti-gang ordinances; one merely has 
to dress in a way that makes one look like a gang member, as defined by the mall in question."). 
33 Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 88. 
 
34 Id. at 92; see also Wakefield, supra note 11, at 134. 
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The basis for exclusion and the extent that such is employed varies from one mass private 
space to another.35 As already mentioned, the owner of the private space might exclude a person 
based upon his or her behavior at that particular moment.36 Additionally, an owner of mass private 
property might attempt to ban persons convicted of criminal offenses (either committed in that 
particular space or elsewhere).37 Further, and most controversially, SCP in mass private space may 
take the form of excluding persons who fit a particular profile.38 Thus, security guards may exclude 
people “whose behavior or body language is perceived as suspicious [or] who seem out of place in 
relation to the area or time of day.”39 Moreover, security guards might exclude persons who fit a 
particular demographic or social circumstance, such as young people or the homeless.40 
35 See Wakefield, supra note 11, at 134. 
 
36 Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 87; Wakefield, supra note 11, at 132; ZEPP, supra note 29; Josh Mulligan, 
Finding a Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated Towns, and the Promise of PruneYard, 13 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 533, 534 (2004) (“However, private interests, usually corporations, control the simulated spaces—the 
shopping malls, the gated communities, and the private parks. Because these simulated spaces are privately-owned and 
controlled, owners regulate behavior within by exerting the most fundamental property right—the right to exclude.”). 
 
37 See id. at 90-91; Wakefield, supra note 11, at 131-32. 
 
38 Id; see also Wakefield, supra note 11, at 130-31;  Harris, supra note 2, at 8-10 (“Consumer Racial Profiling (CRP) is 
defined as any type of differential treatment of consumers in the marketplace based on race or ethnicity that constitutes 
a denial or degradation in the product or service offered to the consumer.  In a retail environment, CRP can take many 
forms, ranging from overt or outright confrontation to very subtle differences in treatment, often manifested in forms of 
harassment.  Outright confrontation includes verbal attacks, such as shouting racial epithets, and physical attacks, such 
as removing customers from the store.  Customer harassment includes slow or rude service, required pre-payment, 
surveillance, searches of belongings, and neglect, such as refusing to serve African-American customers . . . . On the 
other hand, some statistical theories suggest that overt disparate treatment simply arises from a retailer's desire to 
maximize profits and minimize costs, and does not reflect animus towards a particular group.  A retailer who engages in 
"revenue-based statistical discrimination" makes a presumption about the potential revenue he or she may receive from 
different types of customers and acts accordingly . . . . Unwittingly, some retailers make assumptions about their black 
customers based on stereotypes relating to the propensity of African Americans to commit crimes and their inability to 
pay for goods.”). 
 
39 Wakefield, supra note 11, at 130. 
 
40 See id. at 130.  The right of an owner of mass private property to exclude someone without having a valid basis for 
such varies from the US to the UK.  And, in the US, the standards are different from state to state.  In the UK, the owner 
of a property that is generally open to the public can exclude someone without giving any reason. CIN Properties Ltd. v. 
Rawlins, [1995] 2 E.G.L.R. 130.  The US Supreme Court has given states the power to decide whether property owners 
may exclude persons arbitrarily, holding that one does not have a federal constitutional right to enter private property, 
even if it is generally open to the public, but also holding that a state’s requiring a property owner who opens her 
property to the general public to not exclude persons arbitrarily does not violate the property owner’s rights.  PruneYard 
Shopping Center, 447 U.S. 74; Klear, supra note 6.  In light of this holding, several state supreme courts have 
interpreted their respective constitutions in various ways as regards the right to exclude from mass private property.  For 
example, in New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994), the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that regional shopping centers could not exclude persons wanting to hand out literature 
on their property concerning policy issues but could impose reasonable restrictions upon such activity. 
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Other forms of SCP, such as CCTV surveillance41 or employment of private security guards 
may also take place on mass private property.  However, the use of SCP techniques other than 
exclusion and the imposition of behavioral standards in mass private space do not raise issues 
peculiar to their use there—they raise the same type of legal, ethical and other issues when used in 
mass private space as they do if used in other private or public spaces.42 
II. Current Conceptions/Theories of Regulating Situational Crime Control in Mass 
Private Space.
This section provides an overview and critique of some of the arguments raised concerning 
regulating SCP in mass private space.  Additional critique of these arguments will inhere in the 
arguments I put forth in Sections III, IV and V. 
 Arguments as to the authority that owners/operators of mass private property should have 
with regard to SCP have generally been substantive and fixed.  Such arguments thus seek to reach a 
conclusion as to what techniques are appropriate on mass private property and do not take account 
of the variability of relationships that may exist between mass private property and the people who 
live near the property and/or would wish to frequent it.43 Moreover, the arguments do not engage 
the issue of the mechanism by which decisions should be made as to what forms of SCP are 
acceptable in a given mass property.  And although some scholars have recognized that the quantity 
and quality of SCP that one may employ might vary from person to person or place to place,44 
41 Andrew von Hirsch, The Ethics of Public Television Surveillance, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 59;  see also Marcus Nieto, Public Video Surveillance: Is It An Effective Crime 
Prevention Tool?, http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/05 (last visited Aug. 9, 2006). 
 
42 Private security guards on mass private property of course do raise issues with which this paper is concerned to the 
extent that the guards are involved in excluding persons and enforcing behavioral codes.   Other issues that employment 
of private security raises, such as lack of training, the fact that private actors are carrying out traditionally public 
functions and that a public good may end up going to the highest bidder, fall outside the scope of this paper, because 
those issues, while present with regard to private security guards on mass private property, are not limited in their 
employment to mass private space; these same concerns are raised with regard to private security guards employed in 
other settings. 
 
43 See, e.g. von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 87-95 (setting forth a model delineating what forms of exclusion 
from mass private (and public) property are acceptable without taking account of the role that such space may play in a 
given locality); Clarke, supra note 22, at 110 (putting forth a generally favorable view of SCP, bemoaning its lack of 
acceptance among most academics, but failing to focus upon places and populations as important factors in determining 
the costs and benefits of SCP). 
 
44David Garland, Ideas, Institutions and Situational Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 13 (“SCP also allows a form of local or even individual action that can be 
undertaken directly by those fearful of crime.”);  Duff & Marshall, supra note 23, at 17 (“[T]here are morally significant 
differences between the groups on which SCP measures impact.”);  Michael S. Scott, Community Justice in Policing, 42 
IDAHO L. REV. 415, 433, 436-37 (2006) (“One dimension of the broad community justice approach is that the systems 
in which offenders are adjudicated ought to take better account of the desires, needs, perspectives, and interests of the 
community most directly affected by the offenders' conduct. While crime can be said to have consequences to society as 
a whole, it has more immediate and tangible consequences for the smaller communities in which particular crimes occur 
. . . . Just as individuals have different capacities and competences to solve problems, so too do communities. Not all 
communities or community groups are equally staffed, organized, trained, resourced, connected, or skilled to push the 
buttons and pull the levers of social control to bring about purposeful, significant, and lasting improvements to public 
safety.”). 
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existing scholarship is noticeably void of arguments addressing the issue of what role communities 
in which mass private properties are located should play as arbiters of what is and is not appropriate 
SCP on such properties.45 Some of these scholars have focused upon SCP (including exclusion) in 
terms of mass private space,46 while others have focused on barring given members of the public 
(and other SCP techniques) more generally, whether or not such occurs in mass private space or 
elsewhere).47 
Many commentators have formulated their analysis by explicitly or implicitly treating mass 
private property as if it were purely public space or close to being public space and as such arguing 
in favor of strong limits on exclusion and other forms of SCP.  These include Singer, Garland, Von 
Hirsch and Shearing and Duff and Marshall.   
Singer argues that in contemporary society the common law rule that private business 
owners generally have the right to exclude at their discretion should be changed in favor of a regime 
that would take as a given that any member of the public would have the right to enter shopping 
malls, retail shops, restaurants, places of entertainment and similar businesses.48 Thus, Singer does 
not limit his argument regarding the use of the SCP technique of exclusion to mass private space.49 
Garland, focusing on SCP primarily in the mass space setting, describes exclusion from such 
spaces and other such techniques in wholly negative terms: 
In these private settings (many of which are mass private spaces such as 
shopping malls that happen to be privately owned and administered) 
individuals may be required to submit to searches, or be monitored and 
filmed, and they may be subject to exclusion without cause shown.  There 
is here a rough justice of exclusion and full-force surveillance that has 
become more and more routine in our experience and which is 
increasingly viewed as a necessary condition for securing the safety and 
pleasures of consumers and decent citizens.50 
Von Hirsch and Shearing, also focusing on mass private space, argue that owners/operators 
of such properties should not have broad exclusionary powers since such property “performs the 
 
45 See,. e.g., Wakefield, supra note 11, at 144 (stating that “[f]or privately-controlled territories to operate as sites for 
public life, there is a need to strike a balance in the controls that are adopted, so that they may serve their local 
communities effectively as local communal space” while failing to expand upon this kernel); Judy Johnson, The 
Importance of Obtaining Community Support to Reduce Crime, in HANDBOOK OF LOSS PREVENTION AND CRIME 
PREVENTION 599, 609 (Lawrence J. Fennelly, ed. 1982) (“If crime prevention is to be effective in improving the quality 
of life, the role of the community must be expanded to include supportive efforts from a broad base of organized groups 
wihin a jurisdiction.”). 
46 See, e.g., id. 144 (“For privately-controlled territories to operate as sites for public life, there is a need to strike a 
balance in the controls that are adopted. . . .”). 
 
47 See, e.g., von Hirsch, supra note 38 (discussing the ethics of CCTV surveillance in mass private space and 
elsewhere); John Kleinig, The Burdens of Situational Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 37 (noting the “tendencies. . .associated with attempts to legitimize and elevate 
SCP, but which. . .lead it to overreach its capabilities.”). 
 
48 See Singer, supra note 2, at 1291. 
 
49 See id. 
 
50 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 160 (2001). 
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functions of public space.”51 Although they note that SCP steps such as exclusion may serve to 
reduce crime, the use of such measures “in areas having public use entails serious losses of personal 
liberty.”52 They therefore conclude that a mass private space, such as “a large privately-owned mall 
that invites the public to enter without specification of purpose is. . .offering a public service, and 
thus may be called upon to ensure that all members of the public have proper access.”53 Therefore, 
their analysis “treat[s] as public in character those spaces that clearly are designed for general public 
use.”54 
51 See also Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 773 P.2d 1294, 1300 (Or. 1989) (“Shopping malls have become part of American 
life. Large numbers of the public gather there. Although plaintiff tries to cloak a public mall as a private place, it is the 
antithesis of a private place.”); Alexander, supra note 10, at 44 (1999) (“[T]he modern mall is the new downtown . . . . 
[T]he malls of today have replaced the downtowns of yesterday, and as such, the malls have taken on a public function 
which resembles that of the company town of Marsh, even including streets, restaurants, hotels and churches.”); 
Mulligan, supra note 33, at 539 (“Malls have also shouldered widespread community functions.”). 
 
52 Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 79; see also Magarian, supra note 28, at 121, 124 (“Private property is often 
essential for political debate because so much public interaction takes place in privately owned space, from shopping 
malls to the Internet. No one advocates wholesale appropriation of private property for the sake of public discourse, but 
expressive activity is a natural and appropriate byproduct of the general uses to which certain property owners—such as 
shopping mall owners, media corporations that depend on advertising revenues, and Internet service providers—choose 
for self-interested reasons to dedicate their property. During the campaign against international terrorism, numerous 
property owners of this sort have clamped down on political debate, barring critics of government policies from 
channels of expression opened by their own invitations for the public to use their property. . . . First Amendment law 
has always reflected a central concern with the chilling of speech—the danger that threats or reprisals against unpopular 
speakers will dissuade others from speaking their minds and challenging the status quo. The anticommunist purges that 
followed the two World Wars are only the most prominent examples of how nongovernmental reprisals and 
intimidation can chill political expression.”). 
 
53 Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 87; see also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at ____  (“The more an owner, for 
his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by 
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.  Thus, the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes 
and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated 
primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state 
regulation.”).  
 
54 Id. at 86.  See also Christopher M. Kelly, “The Spectre of a Wired Nation”: Denver Area Telecommunications 
Consortium v. FCC and First Amendment Analysis in Cyberspace, 10 HARV. J. LAW & TEC. 559, 627-28 (Summer 
1997) (“Claims that the Internet is a public forum neglect one major factor that was a significant dividing line among 
the Justices in Denver Area: one of the primary questions in determining whether a potential ‘place’ for speech can be a 
public forum is whether it is in fact public. Privately controlled space cannot generally be deemed a forum open to 
expression without some prior regulatory involvement. There are of course the hard cases of company towns and 
shopping malls that make this distinction a bit more blurry. But that does not mean that there is no public/private 
property distinction, especially when it comes to government action that ‘opens up’ a space for speech access.  The 
different approaches of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas above indicate how characterization of the 
space at issue affects the outcome. Establishing a World Wide Web site, for example, requires both the use of a portion 
of cyberspace that is generally public in character—the network of networks that comprises the Internet—and one that 
is generally private in character—the host computer that the individual posting the page either owns or on which she has 
leased space. When another user aims to access an individual's web page, she goes through the public network to reach 
the private one. Does this somehow trigger a public forum analysis?”); Alexander, supra note 10, at 44 (“Unfortunately, 
the United States Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to engage in expressive activity in 
privately owned shopping malls. While the Court has recognized the individual states' right to extend to their citizens 
greater protections under the state constitution, only a few have done so in this area. Many instead have turned a cold 
shoulder to those seeking to express themselves.  In this context, the promise of American democracy is being 
thwarted.”). 
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Beyond this, Von Hirsch and Shearing then put forth a detailed framework for regulating 
SCP in mass private space.55 They distinguish between long-term/permanent exclusion and short-
term exclusion.56 Inherent in their assertions are arguments about regulation of conduct in mass-
private property,57 since short or long-term exclusion is the general enforcement mechanism for not 
complying with the behavioral standards set by the owner/operator.58 Von Hirsch and Shearing see 
long-term/permanent exclusion from mass private space, whether based on profiling or conduct, as 
problematic under almost any circumstance.59 However, they see brief conduct-related exclusion as 
acceptable.60 
Similarly, Gray and Gray argue against giving broad powers of exclusion to owners of mass 
property, asserting that the English court decision Rawlins, holding that owners of mass private 
property retain the right of arbitrary exclusion,61 was wrongly decided because the power to exclude 
from mass private space, which is functionally public, should be limited to public interest 
concerns.62 Likewise Duff and Marshall, “assume that the mall is or should be a public space, 
providing public goods. . . .”63 Thus, they assert that SCP measures that curtail people’s freedom to 
 
55 Id. at 88-93. 
 
56 Id. 
 
57 Von Hirsch & Shearing actually do not focus solely on mass private property and in fact speak in terms of public 
space throughout much of their essay.  However, because they view mass private property as public space for purposes 
of evaluating SCP, their public space arguments are also arguments about mass private property. 
 
58 Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 92; Wakefield, supra note 11, at 132. 
 
59 Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 88-90. 
60 Id. at 92-93. 
 
61 See Rawlins, 2 E.G.L.R. 134H-134JJ (Eng.); Joan L. McGregor, Property Rights and Environmental Protection: Is 
this Land Made for You and Me? 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 391, 427 (“For example, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
the owner of a shopping mall asserted that his right to exclude permitted him to stop persons from passing out 
pamphlets at the mall. The state required mall owners to allow private individuals to "exercise state-protected rights of 
free expression." The mall owners claimed this requirement constituted a taking under the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
the court rejected the mall owner's taking argument.  Having control over who enters one's house protects vital interests, 
such as keeping secure private and personal space.  Mall owners cannot claim those same vital interests are violated by 
not being able to exclude persons, who are exercising their right to free expression, from a public mall. Merely 
weighing the interests involved-namely the interest in excluding speakers from a mall and the interest in speaking in a 
place where the public congregates-demonstrates that the more weighty interest is the interest in speech in a public 
place.  This shows we cannot, contrary to Blackstone's beliefs, maintain there is a single incident of ownership that is 
essential to all property claims.”); JEROLD S. KAYDEN, PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE: THE NEW YORK CITY 
EXPERIENCE 21 (2000) (“Furthermore, private owners who openly invite “general” members of the public to enter and 
use their property might expose themselves to certain restrictions on their ability to exclude “specific” members of the 
public.”). 
 
62 Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-Public Space, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 46, 
49-50, 63 (1999). 
 
63 Duff & Marshall, supra note 23, at 21, 28 n. 23;  See also Mulligan, supra note 33, at 561 (“A superior rule would 
hold that wherever the public is freely and openly invited to gather for no particular purpose, the space will be 
considered public, and whoever owns the property will exert control as a state actor.”). 
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enter mass private spaces (either by generally excluding them or ejecting them based upon 
behavior) “exclude[s] them from access to goods. . . in which they should as citizens be able to 
share. . . .”64 Therefore, SCP that involves limiting access or activity in mass private space is 
“intrinsically inappropriate to the proper end of securing the public good of crime prevention, since 
it prevents crime only by transforming, and distorting, that public good into a private good.”65 
The theorists who are more favorable to exclusion and/or other SCP techniques in 
shopping malls and elsewhere, also posit arguments rooted in a fixed view of the 
relationship between a given property and the population who frequents the property and 
live or work near it.    
 For example, Ronald Clarke, “[t]he person most closely associated with SCP,”66 calls for 
greater use of SCP in mass private space and elsewhere67 He notes criticism that some have made 
that “[t]he use of situational crime prevention results in the exclusion of so-called ‘undesirables’ 
(vagrants, the homeless, minorities and unemployed young people) from public places such as 
shopping malls, parks and entertainment facilities.”68 Clark grudgingly acknowledges this concern 
but fails to resolve the issue or seek a solution that takes account of the variability of the cost and 
benefits of SCP from one property to another.69 
Callies and Breemer, and Epstein, focus their respective analyses in this area on the issue of 
the property owner’s right to exclude.70 These scholars are not focused particularly on the issue of 
crime control.  However, because the focus their articles is exclusion (perhaps the most 
controversial form of SCP) from mass private space,71 the issue that is the topic of the instant article 
inheres in their analsys  Therefore, they do not feel compelled to question the extent to which the 
relationship between a particular property and its locale should enter the analysis.  Each argues that 
such is a fundamental right of the private property owner, irrespective of the public characteristics 
of the property.72 
The above noted scholarship (as well as other analyses of the present issue), assume that the 
practices that take place there are the same in quality and degree in mass private spaces across all 
communities.  These articles ignore the variations among communities in which various properties 
are located and the implications those differences have for formulating policy as to the techniques 
 
64 Duff & Marshall, supra note 23, at 21. 
 
65 Id.
66 David Garland, Ideas, Institutions and Situational Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 9. 
 
67 Clarke, supra note 22, at 110. 
 
68 Id. at 104. 
 
69 See id. 
 
70 David L. Callies and J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others From Private Property: A Fundamental 
Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J. OF L & POL’Y 39, 43 (2000); Epstein, supra note 2, at 24. 
 
71 See id; Epstein, supra note 2, at 24. 
 
72 See id.; Epstein, supra  note 2, at 24. 
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that the owners of such properties may employ.  In contract, the present article incorporates this 
relationship between a given property and the community in which it is located as paramount in 
finding a workable solution to the challenge presented by the use of SCP in mass private space.  
III. Re-envisioning mass private space in its dual nature
Commentators have recognized that mass private space does not fit neatly into previous 
conceptions of property.73 However, as noted in the previous section, courts and commentators 
have generally tried to treat mass private property as if it were public space or as if it were purely 
private property.74 Thus “English law now treats mass private space much like purely private 
property [while] American law has important qualifications of that approach, relating for example 
to racial discrimination.”75 While it is true that the American law has been less extreme in its 
treatment of access as compared to the English approach and approaches put forth by scholars, the 
approach of American legislatures and courts still does not recognize the dual nature of mass private 
space. First, some laws, such as those prohibiting exclusion based upon race or gender, apply 
equally to almost all properties open to the public in some sense; there are generally no statutes 
geared specifically for mass private space.  Second, while some court decisions have treated mass 
private spaces as public spaces,76 in doing so they overlook the private nature of the property 
altogether.  In short, the United States approach involves a set of federal and state statues that cut 
back on exclusion generally, irrespective of whether the property is in any sense mass private space 
and inconsistent court decisions, some of which treat mass private spaces as public; some of which 
treat the spaces as private.77 
The instant article posits that mass private property is both private property and public space 
in a sense that neither true (i.e. de jure) public space nor non-massforms of private property is.  
Therefore, in formulating a model, both the private property interests and the public access interests 
need to be taken into account—both are legitimate and the contradictions they raise, while 
presenting a challenge, do not warrant ignoring one interest in favor of the other.78 Put differently, 
mass private space remains private property and that fact cannot be ignored.79 However, at the 
same time, traditional approaches to regulating private property (and for purposes of this article 
SCP on private property) must be reexamined given the de facto public nature of the property.80 
73 See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note___, at 539-540; Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 80. 
 
74 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 24; Singer, supra note 2, at 1291. 
 
75 Von Hirsch, supra note 38, at 74.  See also Gray & Gray, supra note 53, at 49-50, 63 (arguing that mass private space 
is functionally public and should be treated as such). 
 
76 See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590, at 25. 
 
77 See federal Civil Rights Act of 1964; Singer, supra note 2, at 1374-75 (collecting state civil rights statutes that address 
the right of access and rules against discriminating based on various factors such as race and ethnicity in places of 
public accommodation). 
 
78 Cf.  Heller, supra note 21, at  418 (“Private property is a complicated idea to pin down precisely, as its boundaries 
fray at the edges.”). 
 
79 See Epstein, supra note 2, at 22; Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 82-84.  
80 See Mulligan, supra note 2, at 539-541. 
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Despite scholarly and doctrinal debate as to whether private space should be treated as 
public space for purposes of SCP, this collaquey has not further devoloped the notion of mass 
private space having a dual quality.  Von Hirsch’s approach is illustrative.  He states: 
“[T]he public character of [mass private] space and its uses would appear to warrant 
regulation comparable to that appropriate for publicly-owned space with similar 
functions.  Underlying this view is the notion of property as constituted by a bundle 
of rights held by the property owner: some of these may be restricted while 
preserving others.  The owner of mass [private] space thus should be entitled to 
operate and seek to make a profit on it much like other private investment.  But if 
the facility’s use is comparable to that of public space, there should be restrictions 
on practices that infringe the privacy of its users comparable to those that should be 
applicable to public spaces.”81 
While this description is apt, it argues that mass private space is effectively public space.82 
The model proposed in the instant article, in contrast, is based upon the realization that mass private 
property, despite having a public aspect, also retains facets of private property ensures that the 
owner retains some rights (including the right to employ some forms of SCP, particularly exclusion 
and regulation of behavior on her property), and is rooted in the “bundle of rights” paradigm.83 
Similarly, the fact the property is being put to a particular public use means that the private property 
rights that the owner/operator retains from the bundle will be fewer than for other forms of private 
property.84 
The importance of this dual public/private concept of mass private property to the 
framework proposed here is as follows.  The framework has both a procedural and substantive 
quality.  Procedurally it envisions the community (a concept to be discussed in more detail in 
Sections IV and V) as the primary regulators of SCP in mass private space.85 Substantively, 
however, it puts boundaries on what is the legitimate scope of regulation, both in terms of what 
limits the community can impose on the property owner’s use of SCP and on what the community 
may allow the owner to do.86 The dual nature of the property has implications both for these 
boundaries as well as for the procedural components of my framework.   
 The first boundary is rooted in the concept that the space in question is in fact private 
property.  The fact that it is open to the public generally and therefore has a major impact on civic 
 
81 Von Hirsch, supra note 38, at 74 (citing Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 252 (1991)); see also 
Mulligan, supra note 33, at 560 (“The court concluded that Robins v. Pruneyard does not require that a shopping 
center's obligations vis-a-vis expressive activities completely mirror those of the government. Such a conclusion would 
fly in the face of the reality that a shopping center wears two hats: one is as a center of commerce and the other is as a 
public forum located on private property.”). 
82 See id..
83 See  Callies and  Breemer, supra note ____, at 43.. 
 
84 See Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 82-84. 
 
85 See generally Lawrence W. Sherman, Public Regulation of Private Crime Prevention, 539 ANNALS 102 (1995). 
86 Cf. Scott, supra note 43, at 432 (2006) (“One dimension of the broad community justice approach is that the systems 
in which the offenders are adjudicated ought to take better account of the desires, needs, perspectives, and interests of 
the community most directly affected by the offenders’ conduct.”). 
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life, does not of itself merit the conclusion that the property owner has forfeited all property based 
rights.87 Conversely, the fact that the space is privately owned does not merit treating the space as 
though it were the same as non-mass private spaces and allowing the property owner to engage in 
SCP measures merely because he would be allowed to do so if in fact the space in question were 
purely private or open to the public for only limited purposes.88 This argument will be spelled out 
in Section V. 
 Another aspect of the proposed framework is that although the community ought to be able 
to generally decide (within the above mentioned boundaries) which SCP measures are acceptable in 
mass private property to which the community has a connection,89 there are situations in which the 
mechanism of representative community decision-making is suspect.90 Recognizing the dual nature 
of mass private property plays two roles with regard to the issue of procedurally suspect community 
decision-making.  First, it may provide some indication as to when community decision-making has 
run afoul of accepted norms.  Second, it may provide a basis for imposing a solution when the 
community has not acted properly in regulating mass private space.  Section V will expand upon 
this.   
 
IV. Situational Crime Control, Mass Private Space and Community Contingency
As discussed in Section II above, most judicial decisions and commentary concerning the 
regulation of SCP on mass private property has been substantive in nature, delineating which types 
of exclusion and behavior regulation in such spaces are acceptable and which are not.91 These 
writings do not generally call for the community affected by such measures to play a role in 
regulating SCP.   
 
A. What is Community?
Community is a contentious and contested term.  As used in the sociological sense the term 
“[c]ommunity. . .ranges across, and hence borrow meaning from spatial, temporal, kinship, ethnic, 
and institutional reference points.”92 In the last twenty-five to thirty years politicians and some 
academics from a wide spectrum of persuasions have used “community” as a catchall word, either 
 
87 Epstein, supra note 2, at 34. 
 
88 See Vincent, supra note 2, at 221. 
 
89 I will discuss what types of connections to mass private property are necessary to give a community a legitimate 
interest in regulation in Section V.   
 
90 Cf. John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (discussing the role of judicial intervention when the 
representative process does not function properly). 
 
91 See, e.g., discussion supra at note ___; von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 85-95; Wakefield, supra note 11, at 
143-44; PruneYard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. 74; Rawlins, 2 E.G.L.R. 130 (Eng.)). 
 
92 Nicola Lacey & Lucia Zedner, Discourses of Community in Criminal Justice, 22 J. L. & SOC’Y 301, 302 (1995).  See 
also Scott, supra note 41, at 435 (“Determining what is a community and who speaks for it is more than just a semantic 
exercise. To be sure, the term "community" has varied definitions: (1) a group of people living in the same locality and 
under the same government, (2) the district or locality in which such a group of people lives, (3) a group of people 
having common interests, similarity, or identity, (4) society as a whole.”). 
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alone, or in connection with other words.93 Thus, one often hears or reads about “community 
values,” “community penalties” and “community policing.”94 “Community” has been used in 
connection with a range of social and political issues, including, for purposes of this paper, the 
causes of and solutions to the problem of criminal behavior.95 
Used either on its own or as part of a phrase, the word “community” is an emotive one, and 
like “family,” has often been put forth as a unquestionably good thing,96 which many people, 
especially those who have public exposure, are loathe to challenge.97 After all, how could any 
decent person be against “strengthening the community” or challenge the need for “family values?”  
And, it has an appeal for both the Left and Right on the political spectrum: after years of pessimism 
that “nothing works” with regard to the crime problem, starting in the 1970s there was a new 
optimism and agreement across the political spectrum that “that something can be done about crime 
if it is done. . .with the support of the community.”98 
For example, “community penalties” and “community policing” conjure up images of 
progressing and decent ways of dealing with crime.  The Left finds such rhetoric appealing as it 
implies an understanding and less harsh way of dealing with criminals and victims—perhaps 
bringing them together to understand each other and reach a mutually agreeable solution.  The Right 
takes comfort in calls for a return to “community” and for more emphasis on “community values,” 
as such conjures up images of a time when decent people looked out for one another and had rigidly 
defined roles; a time before there was poverty, racial tension, serious crime and ambiguously 
defined gender roles and family unties.  If crime, racism, homosexuality, drug and alcohol abuse 
existed, it only existed in other places—it did not “openly” exist in “decent communities.”  In 
reality, as much recent critical scholarship has pointed out, the “community” whose loss so many 
 
93 GARLAND, supra note 50, at 123. 
 
94 Id. 
 
95 Lacey & Zedner, supra note 71, at 301; GARLAND, supra note 59, at 123; Robert M. Chiappetta, Book Note, 27 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 433 (Summer 2000) (reviewing Todd R. Clear & David R. Karp, BRINGING THE TOOLS OF JUSTICE INTO THE 
COMMUNITY THE COMMUNITY JUSTICE IDEAL: PREVENTING CRIME AND ACHIEVING JUSTICE) (“The institutions of 
justice, such as courts, parole offices, and justice centers, must be geographically located within the neighborhood they 
serve (preferably within the same complex). The process of crime prevention also begins and ends in the community.”). 
 
96 Lacey & Zedner, supra note 71, at 302; Nancy K. Rhoden, Law and Psychiatry Part II:  The Limits of Liberty: 
Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 400 (Spring 1982) (Thus, in the 
community, with all that word's connotations of a warm, caring group of neighbors and friends, the deviant 
mysteriously would be reconstituted.”). 
 
97 See Lacey & Zedner, supra note 71, at 302 (noting that “community. . . carries with it a certain normative force”). 
 
98 Gordon Hughes, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, in CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY: NEW 
DIRECTIONS 123, 124 (Gordon Hughes, Eugene McLaughlin & John Muncie, eds., 2002) (internal quotes omitted).  See 
also Devin J. Doolan Jr., Comment, Community Prosecution: A Revolution in Crime Fighting, 51 CATH. U.L. REV. 547, 
553-54, (Winter 2002) (“During the 1960's, a major transformation took place in the United States criminal justice 
system.  The method of policing shifted from crime prevention and community involvement to a reactive system of 
criminal apprehension and office centralization . . . . The uniformity of the traditional criminal justice system prevented 
law enforcement officials from identifying and addressing citizens' local concerns.”).  Doolan suggests that the tide 
began to turn against this uniform approach to criminal justice in 1982 with the publication of an article by 
criminologists James Q Wilson and George E Kelling in the Atlantic Monthly.  Termed the “broken windows” theory, it 
“established a connection between low-level crime and serious crime.”  Id. at 557.  Doolan then suggests that “the 
broken windows theory inspired the concept of community policing.”  Id.
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cite as the source of modern day problems, from crime to divorce and economic instability, and 
whose resurrection will be salvation for both the deviant and the victim of deviance, probably never 
really existed in the manner and to the degree that those who invoke its name claim; and 
“community” has been used so broadly in recent rhetoric that it in some sense has no fixed 
meaning.99 
In choosing the word “community” as an instrument for regulating SCP, this article employs 
a term that can mean any number of things (or in a sense have no meaning at all).  However, 
although “community” is necessarily a problematic term, by sufficiently defining the manner in 
which it is used here, the term has a meaning that serves the purposes of the proposed model.  That 
is, the instant analysis does not purport to settle the problem of finding one true meaning of 
community, but rather seek a working meaning of community that is sufficient for purposes of the  
argument put forth herein. 
 The uses of “community” can be broken down into community as an end and community as 
a means to other ends.100 The present article employs the term as a means for regulating SCP in 
mass private space.  Moreover, this analysis uses the term community both as an instrumentality for 
regulating SCP in mass private space and as a place in which such regulation takes place.101 
More specifically, the structure that this article puts forth envisions a model in which 
relatively local political entities play a major role in regulating SCP in mass private space located 
within the community to which such political entities are accountable and is therefore flexible.102 
Thus, in many cases representatives, rather than all the members who comprise the relevant 
community, will take action to regulate SCP in mass private space, although, in some jurisdictions 
communities may act through referendum.   
 Another way of understanding the argument in favor of the community as a regulator of SCP 
in mass private space is to examine what should not be the primary manner of regulating SCP in 
mass private space.  Within some broad boundaries discussed in Section V, the types of SCP that an 
owner/operator of mass private property should be allowed to employ should not be decided a
priori, with no reference to the particular property and its role in relation to the place in which it is 
located and the people who would seek to use the space.103 Thus, the model here rejects the 
 
99 GARLAND, supra note 50, at 124; Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, at 40 (1999), 
http://www.belfast.org.uk/report/chapter07.pdf. (last visited Aug. 9, 2006) (“[C]ommunity policing has many 
definitions and has become devalued by frequent and indiscriminate use.”). 
 
100 Lacey & Zedner, supra note 71, at 303; David Nelken, Community Involvement in Crime Control, 38 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBLEMS 239, 239 n.1 (1985); James V. Schall, The Corporation, What is it?, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 105, 109 
(Winter 2006) (“There are two common goods, but in different senses of that word. In Latin they are called bonum 
commune hominis [the common good of man] and bonum commune communitatis [the common good of the 
community].  The first of these is identical in meaning with happiness. It is common in the sense that it is the same in 
essence among all human beings . . . . The other, the bonum commune communtatis, or the good of the social 
community, is a means, not an end. It is common in the sense that all individuals, in their pursuit of happiness, must 
employ it as a means to that end.”). 
101 See Lacey & Zedner, supra note 71, at 304 (noting that “community may be construed as an agency by which social 
policy is pursued and upon which responsibility may be thrust [and] as the locus in which policy initiative may be 
sited.”). 
 
102 See generally Scott, supra note 43, at 435-435 
 
103 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 11 (discussing views held by William 
Blackstone, Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan that placed a high value on law making at the point of 
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arguments in favor of a detailed, substantive framework that is meant to apply in all places.104 
Moreover, regulation of SCP on mass private property should generally not be imposed from 
without by distant judicial, legislative or executive agents.105 
Thus, as regards SCP in mass private space, community refers to: (1) the people who (themselves or 
through representation) will effect the regulation; and (2) the manner in which they will do so, 
although the model leaves much leeway with regard to the latter issue.  At this point, the specifics 
of the community as a population and as a mechanism are still somewhat abstract.  The discussion 
in Section V.B., infra, will add specificity to the general framework developed in the present 
subsection.   
 
B. SCP in Mass Private Space as Contingent upon the Relevant Community 
 
Keeping in mind the above concept of community as both agency and location,106 this 
subsection argues that SCP in mass private space is both a reflection of (and therefore contingent 
upon) the relevant community.  It also argues that for this and additional reasons set forth herein, 
communities should be the primary regulators of SCP in mass private space.  Subsection V.B. then 
elaborates on the logistics of the community as primary regulator of SCP in mass private space.  
Thus, the instant subsection is the “why” of community regulation of SCP, while Subsection V.B. is 
the “how.” 
 Given that both crime and SCP take place in real communities (not in the abstract) and that a 
mass private property is part of a community, the nature and degree of SCP that an owner/operator 
of SCP may take will not only affect the community greatly but in a sense will be an expression of 
the values of the community.107 Further, many aspects about “crime control which purport to be 
universal in fact take their sense and limits of applicability from. . .cultural connections.”108 
Moreover, as Garland notes: “Social groups and individuals are differently placed in respect 
to crime—differently vulnerable to victimization, differently fearful about its risks, differently 
oriented by values, beliefs and education in their attitudes to its causes and remedies.”109 Garland 
adds: 
 
application tailored to the particulars of the circumstance in contrast to the formulation of broader rules to be applied 
across the board). 
 
104 See id. 
105 See Scott, supra note 43, at 433. 
 
106 Id. at 303; Zepp, supra note 29, at 65-66 (“The phrase ‘meet you at the mall’ has become part of our language.  
Although community is, by definition and experience, not something we create, the mall has been successful in 
fostering a sense of community.  Regardless of the negative judgments made against them, malls are indisputably an 
alternative to the ennui and isolation found in urban and suburban America.”).   
 
107 See Vincent, supra note 2, at 221 (“The shopping mall is the cathedral of contemporary culture.  It is the focus of 
what little social life many of us share with others.”). 
 
108 David Nelken, The Future of Comparative Criminology, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY 220, 221 (David Nelken 
ed., 1994). 
 
109 Garland, supra note 50, at 148; see also Michael S. Scott, Disorderly Youth in Public Places,
http://www.proboticsamerica.com/COPS/pubs/COPS05.pdf. (last visited Aug. 9, 2006) (“Communities are often 
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[T]he present-day world of private-sector crime prevention exists in a reflexive 
relationship to the theories and prescriptions of situational crime prevention.  It is in 
this interchange—between the practical recipes of the commercial sector managers 
and the worked-out rationales of criminologists and government policymakers—
that one must locate the strategy or preventative partnership and the habits of 
thought and action upon which it depends.110 
Thus, although Garland sees the social groups as being central to crime and crime control, in 
discussing SCP in the private sector, it is as if the community as it had existed has disappeared, both 
in terms of what does take place and what he believes should take place.111 This is curious in that 
Garland himself argues that the road to SCP in mass private property (as well as other types of late-
modern crime control) lie in changes in communities.112 Yet, when he discusses the tangible 
manifestations of the changes in late 20th and early 21st century, it is as if extra-community entities 
have hijacked the institutions in question from the very society that make such institutions 
possible.113 Most importantly for the issue with which the present paper is concerned, while he 
admits that the types of changes that have taken place could not have occurred but for changes in 
society itself (i.e. communities), even if politicians, the media and corporations were able to build 
upon such changes, he does not look to communities as a possible regulating force for SCP.114 
Thus, one of Garland’s arguments is that changes in late modernity “eventually resulted in 
cultural effects.”115 Culture effects and affects the changes that have occurred.116 Most importantly 
for the model presented in this paper, is the strong link that culture (and therefore community) has 
with crime control.  This relationship, however, is not a one-way street, and, as such, the most 
appropriate source for regulating SCP in mass private space is the community.117 
Similarly, Shapland notes that “the burdens and benefits of a particular technique for 
preventing or controlling crime (such as SCP) fall on different parts of society.”118 She calls for 
 
divided over what constitutes acceptable youth conduct.  This is especially true in areas undergoing substantial 
demographic change—for example, an influx of youth where older residents predominated, or an influx of a new ethnic 
or racial group.”). 
 
110 Garland, supra note 50, at 161. 
 
111 Id. at 161-65, 201-03. 
 
112 Id. at 123-24; Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process of Accountability: Consensus and Conflict at the 
Red Hook Community Justice Center, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (Fall 2003) (“Community courts are part of a 
number of new government models encouraging "community" participation and aspiring to community empowerment. 
These models attempt to narrow the gap between top-down bureaucratic control and participatory local democracy.”).  
 
113 Garland, supra note 50, at 131-38. 
 
114 Id. at 201-03. 
 
115 Id at 163. 
 
116 Id. at 158-63. 
 
117 Id. at 163-65. 
 
118 Joanna Shapland, Situational Prevention: Social Values and Social Viewpoints, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 113, 115. 
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“examin[ing] what SCP looks like from each perspective.”119 She thus points out that SCP might be 
a net gain from the government’s perspective or from the standpoint of those who can afford 
protective devices or are allowed to enter mass private spaces without much problem but a net loss 
for the poor and/or excluded members of society.120 
Shapland’s and Garland’s arguments point out an important issue in terms of evaluating the 
benefits, costs, ethics and other consequences of SCP: these cannot be evaluated in a vacuum; one 
must evaluate these from one or more perspectives.121 However, their arguments also are 
illustrative of the fact that multi-perspective analyses of pros and cons of SCP in mass private 
property (and elsewhere) are dependent upon the nature of the mass private space and upon the 
effects of different SCP measures in various types of properties.122 
As important as the above insights are, the analysis of community variability that the 
literature has generally ignored is equally important.  The role that a given mass private property 
plays in a community will be highly dependent not only on the characteristics of the property123 but 
also upon the demographics, location and other aspects of the community in which it is located as 
well as upon any other communities from which it draws patrons.124 The role that such a mass 
space occupies is also dependent upon crime rates in the area, whether or not alternative locations to 
the mass private property exist, either in other mass private spaces or in public places as well as 
other factors.  Garland acknowledges, “SCP has no fixed ideological meaning or determinate fixed 
political affiliations,”125 while Shapland argues that SCP does not itself contain the ethical 
boundaries and constraints necessary to set acceptable limits to the choice of technique to apply,  
SCP merely provides a palette of techniques.126 Thus the impact of SCP in mass private space can 
be fixed only with regard to both the manner in which it is employed and also to the relationship 
between a given mass private space and the community relevant to that space.127 Many scholars 
 
119 Id.
120 Id. at 115-16. 
 
121 See id.; Garland, supra note 50, at 163. 
 
122 See id. 
123 See generally Wakefield, supra note 11, for a description of three such properties and the different persons that tend 
to use these facilities as well as differences in the types of persons who were likely to be excluded or be the subject of 
other SCP measures. 
 
124 For example, all other factors being equal, mass private space is likely to play a more important role in cold weather 
cities where most people would rather shop or spend leisure time in an indoor facility than on city streets than in a 
warmer climate.  So too, one might expect that in a cold weather city that there would be more mass private properties, 
thus providing patrons (and thus potentially excluded individuals) alternative locations.  Conversely it might be argued 
that in a cold weather city in winter exclusion from a mass private space may be more oppressive since the excluded 
person may have then be faced with spending time either at home or in inclement weather, whereas the person excluded 
from such an establishment in a city with milder weather is more likely to have the option of walking around or 
shopping in the public downtown area. 
 
125 Garland, supra note 44, at 14. 
 
126 See Shapland, supra note 91, at 121. 
 
127 See id. 
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seem to be aware of these facets but do not look to them as a source for making, to paraphrase 
Shapland, difficult choices.128 
The meaning and impact of SCP measures employed in a given space will be both 
objectively and subjectively contingent upon the communities where the space is located and upon 
the ones it serves.  They are likely to be objectively contingent, in the sense that the characteristics 
of the community, the mass private space in question, as well as the nature of the SCP employed 
will have different impacts in different communities.129 The effects are also subjectively 
contingent, as the individual and collective experiences of a given community will be a partial 
determinant of how members of that community experience SCP measures that an owner/operator 
of mass private space employs.130 
For example, consider the objective and subjective implications of excluding people under a 
certain age (unless accompanied by an adult) from a shopping mall that is essentially the only 
public place where most of the community’s senior citizens can go, in that many do not drive and 
there is no convenient public transportation for them, but that is located in a community where there 
are other choices available for young people (perhaps other mall that are too far away for many 
elderly or physically challenged persons to reach given their relative immobility but which 
teenagers excluded from this space could reach without great difficulty).131 Objectively and 
subjectively speaking, the positive impact on the seniors and others who have limited mobility may 
be quite strong while the negative impact on the excluded teenagers small.  The former group may 
be particularly suspect to crime and excluding youths, while painting with a broad brush, may lower 
the risk of the elderly and physically challenged being victims of crime (objective) and their feeling 
unsafe (subjective) while at the mall.132 And if such SCP is not employed, the seniors and those 
with disabilities will have to choose between forgoing engaging in public interaction and exposing 
themselves to risk and fear.  The excluded group has other options (objective) and also may not feel 
particularly stigmatized by their exclusion (subjective), since they are not being kept out of a space 
to which their peers have access and are being kept out for the protection of the elderly, a purpose 
that is arguably not a stigmatizing one for youths.   
 Consider a second scenario in which, as in the above example, a mall engages in a policy 
whereby no one under a certain age may enter unless accompanied by an adult.133 Assume also that 
this mall is in a poor neighborhood and that the youths who live in this neighborhood do not have 
reasonable access to a similar facility.  Assume that there are other malls located some distance 
away, in wealthier neighborhoods, which are too far away for the excluded youth to reach, but that 
 
128 See id.
129 Kleinig, supra note 58, at 48; von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 89. 
 
130 Shapland, supra note 91, at 117. 
 
131 See Alysa B. Freeman, Comment: Go to the Mall with my Parents? A Constitutional Analysis of the Mall of 
America’s Juvenile Curfew, 102 DICKINSON LAW REV. 481, 481-82 (1998). 
132 Cf. Zedner, supra note 6, at 15 (discussing situational crime prevention as involving steps that attempt to make 
people safer as well as to make them feel safer and the fact that accomplishing one of these goals will not necessarily 
accomplish the other, as well as arguing that in some cases more visible safety measures may make people feel less safe 
by making them more aware of the risk of crime). 
133 See Freeman, supra note 231, at 481-482. 
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the young people in those neighborhoods are situated such that they can frequent these other 
venues, which do not have a similar exclusionary policy. 
 In this case, members of the excluded group have been foreclosed from taking advantage of 
the only available shopping or public interaction experience (objective) and may feel stigmatized, 
knowing that their peers in wealthier districts have access to shopping malls or other facilities to 
which they do not (subjective).  Thus, the variability of the communities in which the mass private 
spaces are located and the relationship between the spaces and the communities in the first and 
second examples shows that objectively and subjectively the consequences of the exclusionary 
policy will be different from the standpoint of both excluded and non-excluded/protected groups. 
 The above examples support the argument that one cannot derive a broad substantive 
formula that will apply to a given SCP practice in a given type of mass private property that is 
applicable to all communities.  As Shapland describes it: 
SCP is not the kind of crime reduction initiative that can be delivered top-down in a 
uniform manner . . . .  This means that SCP has to be usable for those implementing 
it locally.  It is they who need to understand the palette and its applicability to their 
situation.  It is also they who will work through the ethical implications of their 
chosen SCP activities. 134 
Therefore, given that there are so many variables, the community in which the mass private 
property is located is best suited to make a determination as to what types of SCP practices are and 
are not acceptable.135 
There is another reason that calls for making the community the primary regulator of SCP in 
mass private space.  SCP involves first order issues as to what weight should be accorded certain 
values.136 There is no objective answer to how much weight the safety of easily victimized 
members of society (or their subjective feeling of security) should be given relative to that of the 
right of access to community members that are easily marginalized.137 And for any set of variables, 
there will be a number of competing values for which the correct balance admits to no 
predetermined formula: the freedom of one to express himself against the interest in being able to 
have a setting free from offensive conduct and speech;138 the interest of people to hang about in a 
large group in a fixed area versus the interests of those who wish to walk comfortably around the 
 
134 Shapland, supra note 91, at 121-22;  see also Johnson, supra note 42, at 602 (“Participation in community ‘crime 
prevention efforts is not merely desirable but necessary.  Police and other specialists cannot control crime; they need all 
the help the community can give them.’”) (quoting NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS &
GOALS, CMTY. CRIME PREVENTION 7 (1973)). 
135 In the next subsection and in Section V, I will further explore the issue of what constitutes the relative community 
and explore issues about decision-making, representation and problems of externalities. 
 
136 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 42 (recognizing that society’s understanding of facts and values is the society’s “very 
identity” and is subject to shift over time, rather than being some fixed exogenous truth). 
 
137 Cf. id. 
 
138 It is here that a crucial difference between public and private property emerges.  While there may well be good 
reason for protecting freedom of expression on private property, the interests involved are not the same as when the 
property is public.  With public property there is the special concern about the government’s quashing of disfavored 
speech.  While there may be concerns about a private interest quashing expression, I submit that even in post-modern 
society, government maintains a monopoly on enforcement that is qualitatively and quantitatively different than any 
private interest.   
 
Regulating Situational Crime Prevention in Mass Private Property 
 26
space, as well as the interest of the owners of various businesses in not having the entranceways to 
their shops impeded; the interest that teenagers have in having a place to go (and perhaps the 
interest of their parents in their having a place to go that is safer than local neighborhood streets) 
versus the desire that some adults might have in going to a place that is free from teenagers.  In 
addition, the interest of the owner/operator of the mass private space in creating an environment that 
is in her (and her tenants’) pecuniary interest as well as one consistent with her ethical and personal 
concerns139 may clash with the interest of those who wish to take advantage of the space.   
 Also, it as at the community level that crime and SCP manifests itself.140 While there is a 
myriad of data on aggregate criminal activity, crime and the fear of such manifests itself in the 
forms of discrete events affecting individuals living in a given community, and the reality and fear 
of crime has become part of everyday life in many communities.141 Similarly, while the emergence 
of SCP or mass private space can arguably be examined across nations or as a phenomenon of late 
modernity,142 it also is something that affects individuals and communities.  Some groups of people 
are excluded or feel unwelcome in a particular mass private space.  Just as crime has become a part 
of everyday life for many people, so too has being the subject or target of SCP in mass private 
space.143 This community of people is thus affected and in this sense are part of the community that 
should be given a say as to the nature and extent of SCP in mass private property.    
 In addition, within certain bounds, discussed in Section III, supra, and in Section V, infra, 
the extent and nature of SCP techniques employed in mass private space are matters that not only 
are best decided by the community in question, but also are ones that are important for the 
community to decide. 144 It is not just that the community is best situated to evaluate the various 
concerns that are present within it, but that the community can express itself by regulating the 
manner in which spaces that may be the major public place of interaction deal with people who may 
 
139 While pecuniary concerns may be overwhelmingly the focus of owners/operators of mass private space, they may 
not be the only ones.  Certainly where the owner is an individual or a company that is controlled by one or a small 
number of individuals, it is not unreasonable that the owner would not want people who are wearing garb expressing a 
hateful message or simply and insensitive one.  For example, somebody who appears in Nazi regalia either because he 
subscribes to the tenets of Nazism or because he gets amusement out of it. In the case of public property, one’s right to 
so express themselves ought to be protected lest the government have the power to allow the expression of one 
viewpoint over another.  Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2492-93 (2000).  However, the owner of a piece of mass 
private property may be highly offended by such a display (or may not wish to allow such offensive display) and there 
is an argument that he should not have to tolerate such on his property.  See Winnie Hu, Message of Peace on 2 Shirts 
Touches off Hostilities at a Mall, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2003 (reporting a case in which the operator of a mall sought to 
expel a patron who was wearing a sweatshirt that expressed opposition to America’s fighting a war in Iraq). 
 
140 Cf. Scott, supra ___,. at 417 (“[I]it is the community, as opposed to say, territory that [police] are policing [and] the 
interests fo the community, and not just the government, that the police ought to take into account when policing.”). 
 
141 Garland, supra note 44, at 12. 
 
142 Garland, supra note 50, at 159; von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 80-81. 
 
143 Garland, supra note 44, at 12. 
 
144 See Duff & Marshall, supra note 23, at 21 (arguing that beyond the costs and benefits of SCP on different groups, 
“[w]e should also attend. . .to [SCP measures’] meanings: to the attitudes, the conceptions of citizens and their mutual 
relationships, that they manifest”).  
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wish to enter the space as well as with how these spaces deal with the risks to and fears of those 
who it invites to enter.145 
In that a community by definition expresses itself by its manner of punishment, so too does 
it express itself by where it draws the line between safety levels and degrees of freedom and 
between property rights and access rights.146 This argument treads closely to discussing mass 
private space as though it were public space.  However, there is a key distinction.  Under the 
proposal put forth herein, communities and/or their representatives would not directly regulate 
conduct.  Rather they would be giving more or less leeway to the owner of private property to 
regulate conduct solely on the property in question based upon the particular circumstances of the 
community and its ethics and values.  Additionally, the boundaries, alluded in Section III, above, 
and detailed in Section V, below, distinguish my model from one that treats mass private property 
as purely public space. 
 The community role in regulating SCP on mass private property is narrower in some sense 
and broader than others than direct community and/or the state regulation of public spaces.  It is 
narrower for the reasons that as discussed in Section III, above, and V, below, that a mass private 
property owner/operator may (and ought to) be given more leeway to control access and activity in 
her space than the government may on public property.  It is broader in the sense that the 
community is only putting limits (and the limits it may impose are bounded) on what the mass 
private property owner/operator may do vis-à-vis his or her space (but will inevitably be giving the 
property owner leeway since he or she may do less than the community allows or more than the 
community requires), not regulating the conduct itself.  And it is qualitatively different since the 
community is acting directly only upon the SCP measures that the owner/operator might apply in 
the mass space, not upon the patrons themselves, as it would be in regulating conduct in public 
spaces. 
 
V. Creating a Framework for Regulating SCP in Mass Private Property in Terms of its 
Dualistic Nature, its Role in the Community and Community Values
Having argued in previous sections that regulation of SCP in mass private property involves 
taking account of both the fact that the property is privately owned and also is put to use much as 
public property is, and also that such regulation should be undertaken by the community, in this 
section the article spells out a framework for such regulation that takes account of these aspects of 
mass private property and SCP.  Moreover, in addition to substantive differences that argue in favor 
of different communities having the power to regulate the substance of SCP that owners of mass 
private property may employ, there is also a procedural variability from place to place.  That is, 
different communities may wish to have not only different substantive standards of permissible SCP 
but also wish to have different procedural mechanisms about the way they formulate such standards.  
Despite this variability and flexibility, the model presented can provide a broad framework as to the 
role of and the limits upon community involvement.  This framework has three categories: (1) 
boundaries; (2) scope of relevant populations; and (3) mechanisms.   
 
145 See id. 
 
146 In referring to the expressive use of punishment, I do not mean in the sense that the community affirmatively takes 
steps to punish with the purpose of expressing itself.  Rather, I am putting forth the view that when society punishes, 
whatever the impetus for such, that it inevitably expresses itself.  Durkheim, supra note 9, at 79-80. 
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A. Boundaries 
As used here, boundaries provide upper and lower limits on what communities may allow or 
forbid regarding SCP in mass private property.  This is one way in which mass private property’s 
dual public/private nature is important.   
 
1.   Existing Boundaries 
 
The United States Supreme Court has essentially delegated the power to rule on the right to 
exclude (and employ other forms of SCP) from mass private space to Congress and to states.147 As 
such, in the US, regulation of SCP has taken place in the form of federal regulation such as the 1964 
civil rights act as well as through state court rulings and state legislation.148 While this creates 
variation among jurisdictions “[t]he message of the contemporary American cases, although as yet 
far from uniform, thus suggests a resurgence of concern that the territorial control of large-scale 
private owners should not be permitted to overreach the essential liberties of the citizen.”149 
2. Envisioning Boundaries 
 
There should be both substantive and procedural limits on what measures a community 
should allow and what limits it may impose vis-à-vis SCP in mass private property.  This subsection 
provides a framework for substantive limits or boundaries.150 Procedural limitations inhere in the 
discussion in subsequent subsections of the role that communities should play in being the primary 
arbiters of SCP in mass private property. 
 The substantive boundaries are rooted in the dual nature of mass private space as both public 
and private property.151 As private property, there are certain rights that the owner retains 
 
147 See Klear, supra note 6, at 589; compare Lloyd, with Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 81. 
 
148 See Singer, supra note 2, at 1373-83 (discussing various state and federal statutes and cases involving exclusion and 
access to places of public accommodation. 
 
149 Gray & Gray, supra note 53, at 76-77.  By way of contrast, the United Kingdom has different boundaries in place 
than the US (and most other common law countries).  Gray & Gray, supra note 53, at 60; compare Rawlins, 2 E.G.L.R. 
130 (Eng) with PruneYard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. 74.  Under Rawlins, in the UK the owner of mass private 
property can arbitrarily exclude whomever he likes and need not make a showing of good cause to do so. Rawlins, 2 
E.G.L.R. 130, [134h-134J] (Eng.); Gray & Gray, supra note 53, at 48-49.  This holding “contrasts remarkably with the 
legal stance now adopted in many parts of the common law world with respect to quasi-public property.”  Further, “the 
coming into force of the Human Right’s Act may lead English courts” to revisit the Rawlins decision and reach an 
outcome consistent with other common law jurisdictions.  While the main point of this article to focus on SCP in the 
United States, it is important to recognize that the boundaries that the United States has currently chosen are not the 
only possible choices for a modern nation. 
 
150 See Duff & Marshall, supra note 23, at 19.  (Discussing ‘side constraint consequentialism’ in connection with SCP).  
Under this view, even if one is trying to maximize social goods (through whatever mechanism) there may be constraints 
that must be respected even if maximizing social goods would call for not so respecting them: the constraints ‘trump.’  
Similarly, in my formulation for regulating SCP on mass private space, boundaries trump community preferences. 
 
151 See Section III, supra.
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irrespective of the fact that she has opened the space to general public use.152 Unlike public 
property, the owner has made an investment in the property and also has a personal stake.153 As 
such, the community should not be allowed to so limit what measures the owner of the property 
may undertake that the property ceases to resemble property.154 
On the other hand, as a space open to the public for general use, there are certain forms of 
SCP that are inherently inconsistent with the property’s being put to such use.155 These limitations 
will not be the same as that which would apply were the property truly public, where the issue 
would concern unacceptable government coercion.  Rather, while drawing to some degree on the 
fact that mass private space resembles public property, the central guiding principle in setting up a 
substantive boundary on unacceptable SCP is that the practices cannot be inconsistent with a facility 
to which the entire community and beyond (the entire world in fact) is invited to enter. 
 The model put forth here does not seek to formulate a detailed reservoir of property rights 
that an owner of mass private property retains so as to delineate which controls on SCP are within 
communities’ purviews.  Nonetheless, the fact that a property owner opens his premises to general 
public use does not, as many theorists have argued, turn private property into public property; under 
the model, the owner retains some portion of the bundle of rights associated with private property, 
even if the public is generally invited to enter for no particular purpose.156 Conversely, because this 
invitation to the public gives mass private space certain characteristics and functions akin to those 
of public property, the bundle or rights that the owner retains is markedly different and necessarily 
smaller than those retained even by the owner of private property that is open to the public for a 
particular use, such as a restaurant.157 
The concept of private property has played a long and important role in the legal history of 
the United States.158 At the same time, modern court cases and commentary recognize that private 
property should not trump social justice, fairness and equal opportunity and access while 
conceptions of what limits can be put on an individual’s use of his or her property may change as 
new forms of property exist, this calls only for an ongoing re-evaluation of the property and 
constitutional rights of owners of less traditional forms of property, not for the jettisoning of the 
concept of private property once it is put to a particular use.159 Moreover, treating mass private 
property as public property has severe fairness and economic consequences.160 Those who have 
 
152 See generally Epstein,, supra note 2; Callies and Breemer, supra note ____. 
 
153 See generally id. 
154 Von Hirsch, supra note 38, at 74.  To the extent that the community would limit the mass private property’s owner’s 
right to exclude, Epstein’s words bear some relevance: “[I]t is difficult to conceive of any property as private if the right 
to exclude is rejected.” Epstein, supra note 2, at 22 . 
 
155 Von Hirsch, supra note 38; von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 85. 
 
156 See Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 81. 
 
157 Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 506 (“The more an owner, for his 
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the 
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”). 
 
158 Callies and Breemer, supra note ___, at 39. 
159 See Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 81; Vincent, supra note 2, at 221. 
 
160 See generally Epstein, supra note 2, at 48-50. 
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invested in private property would effectively lose their investment; those who might wish to invest 
in mass private property might be stripped of their incentive to do so.161 Thus, although the model 
presented here envisions mass private property as qualitatively different from other types of private 
property, the dual public/private quality inherent in the model allows traditional property law to 
serve as a beacon, even if not as an exact marker, in setting the boundary on a community’s right to 
limit SCP. 
 The traditional view that inherent in the concept of private property is the right to exclude 
does play a role in setting some boundary upon the limits that communities can impose on SCP 
measures that owner/operators may employ.162 On the other end are boundaries on what SCP 
exclusion and behavioral standard the community may allow the owner of mass private space to 
impose.  This boundary is rooted in the fact that the property is so public in nature.163 So, not only 
may an owner/operator not be given authority to exclude based upon race, religion or nationality 
(bases that would be illegitimate even with private property open to the public only for a specific 
use), but arguably the owner/operator should not be able to exclude groups generally afforded less 
protection than those just listed, such as teenagers or the homeless, without at least providing a 
sound basis for doing so.164 
These bases are illustrative, not comprehensive and it is not possible to enumerate all the 
bases for exclusion that fall beyond this boundary.  What is important to note is that such a 
boundary clearly exists but given the broad range that the model proposes in terms of community 
regulation the territory that this boundary demarcates (just as that which the other boundary, 
limiting community incursion onto a mass private space owner’s property rights) is quite limited; 
the bulk of the substance of what SCP measures an owner/operator may employ should be in the 
province of community regulation. 
 Moreover, even the boundaries are somewhat contingent, but the important difference is 
that, unlike the range of choices within the boundaries, the boundaries themselves should not be left 
to the political choice of communities.  They are properly the province of constitutional and  
common law court decisions (or perhaps broader political choice, such as the nation, state or 
county, as opposed to the village, town or city level).  The precise boundary against incursion into 
property rights cannot be delineated in the abstract.  The important point for my analysis is that such 
a boundary does exist and that it clearly falls somewhere outside allowing the community to impose 
limits on the property owner’s ability to use SCP that would be valid only if the mass private 
property were treated as public property—notwithstanding its general openness to the public, mass 
private property ought to be treated as a form of private property and this limits the restrictions that 
the community may place on the property owner’s use of SCP. 
 
161 Richard Epstein, Protecting Property Rights with Legal Remedies: A Common Sense Reply to Professor Ayres, 32 
VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 837 (1998). 
 
162 Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 82-83 (“[T]he determination whether a state law unlawfully infringes a 
landowner’s property in violation of the Taking Clause requires an examination of whether the restriction on private 
property forces some people along to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”) (internal quotes and cites omitted). 
 
163 See Vincent, supra note 2. 
164 See Ely, supra note 90, at 76 (citing U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 152-53 n.4 (1938) (“Paragraph three [of 
the Carolene Products footnote] suggests that the Court should also concern itself with what majorities do to minorities, 
particularly mentioning laws ‘directed at’ religious, national, and racial minorities and those infected by prejudice 
against them.”). 
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B. Scope of Relevant Populations 
To this point, this article has dealt with community without addressing the problem of 
defining the contours of the community that is to take part in regulating a particular mass private 
space.  While actual location of mass private property provides a starting point for defining the 
relevant community that should regulate SCP on such property, it does not end the inquiry. 
 There is no exact demarcation of the bounds of community that applies in all 
circumstances.165 Rather, there are two primary criteria by which to evaluate scopes of 
communities: geographic and demographic.166 A key necessity for the validity of my argument is 
that the relevant geographic and demographic communities that are affected by SCP on mass 
private property are represented in the decision making process for implementing regulation of SCP 
within the outer bounds of appropriate community regulation.167 Only if the affected communities, 
viewed from both of these aspects, have a place at the table, will it be possible for regulation of SCP 
to take account of the costs and benefits that SCP measures will have on the affected population. 168 
Moreover, only if such representation occurs will regulation of SCP serve the further step of 
expressing and reinforcing the views, preferences, ethics and mores of the relevant communities. 
 
1. Geographic Community 
 
A mass private space is located in a particular city, town and village will likely serve people 
from adjacent and even non-adjacent municipalities.169 Therefore, simply nominating the governing 
unit wherein the property is located as the relevant community will not satisfy the geographic 
component of my analysis.  Rather, all those whom SCP in mass private space is likely to affect 
should be party to formulating regulations.170 
165 See Scott, supra note 43, at 435 (“Determining what is a community and who speaks for it is more than just a 
semantic exercise.  To be sure, the term ‘community’ has varied definitions: (1) a group of people living in the same 
locality and under the same government, (2) the district or locality in which such a group of people lives, (3) a group of 
people having common interests, similarity, or identity, (4) society as a whole.”). 
 
166 See id. 
167 See  id. 
168 Cf. id. at 433 (“One dimension of the broad community justice approach is that the systems in which offenders are 
adjudicated ought to take betters account of the desires, needs, perspectives, and interests of the community most 
directly affected by the offenders’ conduct.”).   
169 See Shapland, supra note 91, at 117 (discussing the burden of exclusion “from the point of view of local 
communities near the mall”); Robert White, Youth Crime, Community Development, and Social Justice, Youth, in 
CITIES: A CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 155-56, 158 (Marta Tienda & William Julies Wilson Eds., 2002) 
(“Acknowledgment of the rights, worth, and dignity of youth is integral to successful approaches to problem behavior.  
Young people share many commonalities, including lack of adequate resources, a dearth of youth-friendly amenities, 
frequent harassment from authority figures, fear of being victimized, and exclusion from decision-making processes.  
These circumstances constitute a recipe for resentment, frustration, alienation, and retaliation. . . . The provision of 
legitimate alternative activities is a vital ingredient for successful youth crime prevention. . . . “[T]he first task of crime 
prevention is to rebuild communities, and as part of this to foster the ideas of solidarity and cooperation. This can 
initially be approached through the democratization of decision making at the neighborhood level, and by inclusion of 
young people, especially young offenders, in the process.”); Johnson, supra note 42, at 610 (“The group organizers 
must provide opportunities for all groups or individuals to participate in the community-wide program while allowing 
groups to retain their identity if this is important to them.”). 
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The above issue raises two subsidiary ones: (1) how to determine the geographic dimensions 
of the relevant community; (2) once the first determination is made, constructing a mechanism that 
effects the proper representation.  There is no exact relevant community.171 There will be no way to 
determine precisely the location of the populace who wishes to frequent a particular mass private 
property.172 Also, the question of how many users of a mass private space need come from a given 
community (or what percentage of that community need use the mass private space) in order for the 
community to be deemed sufficiently important vis-à-vis the space in order to be part of the 
decision making process does not lend itself to a precise numerical answer.173 
Certainly usage of mass private space does not have to be undertaken by anything close to 
100% of a community in order for that community to be relevant, since such a standard would 
effectively rule out all communities, including the one in which the property is located.174 
Conversely, the fact that a small percentage or number from a given community might wish access 
to the mass private property, is not sufficient for such community to have a say in regulation under 
my model, as this will likely include such a broad swath that the result would swallow the concept 
of a communitarian model of SCP regulation.175 
Nonetheless, to say that a precise answer cannot be provided in the abstract is not to admit 
that no meaningful analysis of the relevant geographic community can be undertaken.176 Although 
it is not possible to gage exactly how many or what percentage of people from a given community 
use a given mass private property, reasonable estimates can be made through surveys at mass 
private spaces as well as within the communities themselves.   
 Deciding how much a given community need use a mass private space in order to be given a 
say in regulating SCP thereon is essentially a first-order policy question not something for which 
there is a precise answer, such as 30%.177 Other than saying that the guiding principle should be 
whether a given community has a significant stake in SCP policies in a given mass private property 
(an admittedly slippery formulation), any policy that this article advocated would necessarily be a 
matter of the author’s opinion as opposed to an answer that would help policy makers make a 
choice. 
Two additional points are in order.  First, the instant proposal is put forth as a starting point 
for further academic analysis and policy implementation not as a final package.  As such, if policy 
makers do adopt the approach herein advocated that over time the question of whether a community 
should or should not be included will become a workable, even if always a contested, matter.  
 
170 See id. 
171 See discussion supra, at notes 166-168.  
 
172 See id. 
 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
 
176 See Scott, supra note 43, at 435 (discussing possible ways in which to demarcate the boundaries of a community).  
 
177 See id. (noting that for some community (in the context of community policing) means a majority or plurality of 
those who work or live in a relatively small geographic area, whereas for others, it means the group of persons who 
would be affected by a particular decision involving this issue). 
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Second, the community wherein the mass private property is located should not decide 
which communities should be allowed input into regulation of SCP in such space.178 There is 
obviously a conflict of interest since allowing other communities to take part will necessarily dilute 
the input of the community in question.  It would be equivalent to allowing voters to decide who 
else is eligible to vote in an election.  Instead, just as boundaries need to be demarcated by some 
authority outside the community, so too must the question of community participation be decided at 
a broader level than the community itself, either legislatively or by judicial decree. 
 
2. Demographic Community 
In some ways delineating demographic community is more problematic than geographic 
community, or at least more controversial.  Much of the commentary criticizing SCP exclusions 
from mass private space points to the fact that the most marginalized groups are the most likely to 
be targets of SCP.179 However, identifying and including marginalized groups will be an easier task 
than delineating relevant geographic communities.   
 Groups such as racial and ethnic minorities and the poor, assuming they are part of the 
geographic community, will by definition be included in any mechanism by which a community 
would make decisions regulating SCP on mass private space, whether it be legislatively or by 
referendum.  That is to say, it is unlikely that anyone would put forth an argument (and if they did it 
would fall on deaf ears) that minorities or those earning less than  a certain amount per year cannot 
take part in decisions based on such status.180 Beyond this, however, there is surely an issue as to 
whether these groups may not have sufficient representation either with regard to a direct 
referendum or in terms of electoral politics for their concerns to be heard.181 This is an issue I 
address in the next subsection.  Also, there are some groups that will fall in the geographic 
community who may face resistance to their inclusion in direct community decision-making or to 
their choosing community representatives.182 The groups that stand out in this regard are the 
homeless and/or vagrants, persons with criminal records and youths.183 SCP may particularly target 
these groups.184 
178 Cf Ely, supra note 90, at 83 (discussing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV as ensuring that those 
who make the decisions in a given jurisdiction (namely a state) do not discriminate against citizens from outside the 
jurisdiction, who by definition are politically powerless within the jurisdiction in question).  
 
179 Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 88-90; Shapland, supra note 91, at 117; Wakefield, supra note 11, at 130-
31; Gray & Gray, supra note 53, at 66; Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and 
the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1087 (March 2005) (“To those who 
tend to be skeptical of the exercise of local power because it has traditionally been used to exclude marginalized groups, 
Sandel's politics will appear retrograde. And to those who believe that one cannot effectively protect local economies 
from the expansion of global markets without serious social welfare losses, the protectionist economic policy that 
Sandel celebrates will appear naive.”). 
 
180 Cf. Ely, supra note 90, at 75-76 (discussing the famous Carolene Products footnote, seen as ensuring that insular 
minorities are not excluded from representative decision-making). 
 
181 See id. 
 
182 See Wakefield, supra note 11, at 130-131; 
 
183 See id. 
Regulating Situational Crime Prevention in Mass Private Property 
 34
It is admittedly a concern that those under a certain age neither have the right to vote nor to 
take part in community meetings and those who are without established addresses may be de facto, 
even if not de jure, disenfranchised.  Also, those who have criminal records, also a frequent target 
of SCP,185 may also not have voting privileges, depending upon the jurisdiction and the crimes for 
which they have been convicted. 
 The above concerns are certainly issues with which those who might wish to take my 
analysis further will have to grapple if attempts to implement the proposed approach are undertaken.  
However, the problems about lack of representation of the groups just mentioned are not particular 
to SCP (it is true for any issue, some of which may affect such groups more severely than SCP 
measures in mass private space).186 It may be that in cases the question of lack of proper 
representation will require politically insulated bodies to intervene (as discussed in the next 
subsection).  However, depending upon the circumstances, the interests of these persons may be 
protected by others as they have been with regard to issues other than SCP and mass private space.   
 Parents certainly have a direct interest in the options open to their children.  Various groups 
advocate on the behalf of criminals, ex-cons and the homeless.  Moreover, communities may look 
beyond narrow self-interest in setting policies, in that “people may. . .want to. . .act fairly. . .and to 
be seen as acting fairly. . .[and] may sacrifice their. . .self interest in order to [do so]. . . .”187 The 
extent to which communities will take these interests into account will probably vary from 
community to community.  My expectation is that my approach will require some intervention, but 
not exclusive control, by extra-community decision-makers, whether these are courts or political 
actors that are beholden to a wider constituency. 
 
184 See id;: Gray & Gray, supra note 53, at 66; Michael Myers, Roundtable: Law and Disorder: Is Effective Law 
Enforcement Inconsistent with Good Police-Community Relations?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.  363, 391-92 (December 
2000) (“We have substituted a War on Poverty with a war on the poor. There are many things they can do in the war on 
the poor that are constitutional, that have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. In law enforcement matters, 
the so-called Broken Windows theory is the linchpin of the war on the poor; the war on the homeless; the war on the 
vagrants; the war to bring decent citizens back to "our public spaces"; the war to "take back the streets" and subways; 
the war to make sure that "aggressive panhandlers" are not hanging around the ATM when you withdraw money, 
whether or not they intend to rob you; the war against truancy by picking up students on their way to school, even if 
they are just stragglers, rather than truants; and the war on squeegee people.”); Mulligan, supra note 33, at 541 (“Even 
when clothing does not display a controversial political message, shopping malls routinely expel shoppers for their 
attire. An article in the online magazine Salon details the growing trend of malls forbidding shoppers from wearing 
"gang related" clothing while on the premises.  One St. Louis area mall even expelled rap star Nelly from mall property 
for wearing a "do-rag," which was an item of clothing the mall's dress code expressly forbade.  Because it is 
exceedingly difficult to tell exactly what gang clothing is, the real purpose of the policy appears to be to give mall 
security carte blanche to expel black youths from mall premises, rather than to prevent gang activity.  Some critics 
agree, charging that the anti-gang clothing policies are actually a form of "ethnic cleansing" aimed at young black 
males.”). 
185 Wakefield, supra note 11, at 131-32; Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public 
Sphere, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 93, 122 (Winter 2005) (“An individual could also be discouraged from entry because 
her identity is linked to recent context trails, such as a visit to the gun store or negative reputation in a permanent 
financial, criminal, marketing, or other ‘blacklist’ database.”). 
 
186 Consider issues such as the age of consent for sexual relations, the drinking age and driving age, all of which are 
determined without the direct input of those affected.  Similar arguments could be made regarding a variety of policies 
that affect the homeless and those with criminal records.   
 
187 CASS SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 8 (2000). 
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C. Evaluating the Validity of Community Decision Making and Remedying the Process 
When Necessary 
 
This article has set forth a primarily procedural solution to what scholars and policy makers 
have generally tackled as a substantive problem.188 The framework does include substantive 
dimensions, in terms of boundaries as well as mechanisms for defining the relevant community.189 
Beyond this, although the analysis has pointed to the problem of defining community, the issue of 
what amounts to legitimate community decision-making remains to be evaluated. This harkens back 
to the procedural issue referenced in Section IV and also addresses matters alluded to in the 
preceding subsection regarding the concern that even if technically allowed to participate in 
decision-making, certain populations in the community affected by SCP on mass private property 
may not be effectively represented.  This may occur with SCP on mass private property as well as 
with regard to any issue that affects under-represented groups since “[n]o matter how open the 
process, those with the most votes are in a position to rate themselves advantages at the expense of 
others, or otherwise refuse to take their interest into account.”190 
As mentioned above, the fact that a given group is under-represented does not necessarily 
mean that its interests will be ignored.  This is not only an important fact in itself, but also a prelude 
to determining when deliberative community decisions may disregard legitimate interests of 
marginalized groups.  There are two reasons that seemingly under represented groups’ interests will 
be protected. 
 First, even if one were to assume that the members of the relevant community will act in 
pure self-interest, it is possible that a plurality or even majority may agree on a policy that favors a 
minority group. 191 This is because it may be the case that people having different underlying 
beliefs or higher order preferences may agree on a lower level outcome because this outcome is 
consistent with the higher order preference of each group.192 An example of this phenomenon 
(what Sunstein refers to as incompletely theorized agreements)193 from outside criminology is two 
people agreeing that some form of elective abortion should be legal, where one person reaches this 
outcome because he believes that a woman’s right to reproductive choice is a fundamental aspect of 
a free society while the other person does not believe this but concludes that if made illegal, 
abortion would still take place at the same rate on the black market, thereby not reducing the 
number of abortions while increasing the risk to woman undergoing the procedure.  An example 
from the mass private property/SCP field involves those under eighteen who may wish access to a 
given mass private space.  Their parents may wish that they have access, since they may see this as 
a good social outlet and a safe setting.  Store owners as well as other members of the community 
 
188 Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, supra note 74 (setting forth a model whereby ‘the 
community participat[es] in its own policing’ as an example of an area in which a procedural solution was proposed). 
 
189 See discussion supra, at subsections V.A and V.B. 
 
190 See Ely, supra note 90, at 135. 
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may conclude that excluding people based upon their age is bad for the community because it 
excludes a portion of the population that will spend money within the community and if excluded, 
will spend the money outside the community (to the detriment of merchants and others in the 
community that may reap tax revenue or simply a stronger economy in the community from the 
purchases of this under represented group).194 Thus, although those under eighteen may have no 
direct say in the decision-making process and their parents may not be a large enough group to 
protect their interests, their interest in access may ultimately be protected due to the agreement on 
outcome by different groups motivated to reach that outcome for different reasons.   
 Second, recent studies have shown that even when acting in their self-interest as economic 
maximizers, what individuals view in their self-interest or that from which they get utility is not 
necessarily narrowly defined. 195 Thus, “people, in their capacity as political actors may attempt to 
satisfy altruistic or other-regarding desires which diverge from self-interested preferences. . . .” 196 
Thus, to some degree people get utility out of actions or supporting policies that benefit others and 
not taking actions or opposing policies that harm others.197 The extent of this obviously varies from 
person to person and from issue to issue.  Thus, some people may donate a large percentage of their 
income to charity while others will not.  In the field of both civil rights and criminal justice, the fact 
that popularly elected governments have implemented policies that put limitations on punishment or 
protect certain groups from discrimination is an example of this.   
 The US (as well as the UK and some other countries) certainly have become more punitive 
in the last several decades and more willing to implement SCP policies that fall most harshly on 
marginalized groups.198 Moreover, there is no way to measure the exact amount of utility 
maximization present in a society that goes beyond pure self interest, in general or with regard to 
SCP on mass private property.  However, these points demonstrate that one cannot simply rebut the 
call for community regulation of SCP on mass private property by pointing out that in any 
community there are groups that are in the minority that will be harmed by policies implemented by 
the majority.199 
With the above in mind, the issue becomes to what extent within the boundaries discussed 
above should a community, as defined it herin, be the sole arbiter of what SCP measures may be 
 
194 This example is merely illustrative.  Merchants that lease space in mass private property may conclude that the 
presence of large groups of youths is a net loss as may be the case for adult members of the community who do not have 
children younger than eighteen who would wish to frequent the property. 
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taken by an owner/operator of mass private space.200 The model presented here posits that under 
ideal conditions, members or representatives of the community should formulate such regulation.  
However, as previously alluded, communities and/or their representatives will not always function 
properly or fairly.201 
This raises two issues: determining when the community falls short of being an ideal arbiter 
and what to do when it does so.  In terms of not functioning ideally, this model looks at this as a 
procedural issue, rooted in the concepts with which this section opened.202 That is to say, the power 
structure of the community may be such that some groups are simply harmed based on power 
differential combined with the self-interest of a majority or concentrated minority.203 And as  
mentioned in Section III, one of the guideposts for this portion of the analysis is examining the dual 
aspects of mass private space as private property and also as a facility generally open to the public 
in a manner that other private property is not.204 
To be clear on this point, to conclude that a decision of a community harms some while 
benefiting others based upon differences in preferences is not sufficient to say that the community 
decision-making mechanism is not functioning properly.205 To so conclude would be to cast 
aspersion on any policy implemented in a democratic state.  Also, it is important to keep in mind 
that the playing field at this point is only that which is between the boundaries established above.  
Thus, at this stage one need not be concerned with policies that no matter how popular violate 
fundamental principles such as that one should not be denied access to a mass private space based 
upon his race.   Rather, the problem must be within the mechanism itself, not in the ultimate 
outcome.206 One may look at the outcome as evidence of mechanistic dysfunction.207 But the 
outcome itself cannot be the sole reason for taking steps to override community preference.   
 The concept of illegitimate community decision-making is thus a somewhat elusive concept, 
although Ely’s seminal work on policing the political process provides a point of reference.208 The 
key is that however desirable community decision-making is with regard to SCP in mass private 
property, it is only desirable to the extent that the community acts in a fair manner.  The 
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determination of such cannot be based simply on undesirable results but rather must be rooted in a 
process that does not allow full and fair participation of interested parties.209 
If within boundaries the community decision-making process is not properly functioning, 
then it is necessary to have recourse to remedial measures.  Once again, there is a single correct 
solution to this problem that will work in all cases; there are several possibilities.  One approach is 
for courts to impose their own substantive standards.210 A second possibility is to bring the 
decision-making process to a broader and higher democratically accountable body.  This might 
mean formulating legislation at the county, state or national level (as opposed to at the village, town 
or city level).  An example of this is American federal civil rights legislation, in which the federal 
government imposed limits on racial discrimination by privately owned places of accommodation 
(such as hotels) due to the failure of many states to do so.211 
A third possibility, most associated with Ely, is for courts to intervene, not to impose their 
own substantive standards, but to “police the process or representation.”212 Under this approach, 
which Ely asserts is the basis behind much important American Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
courts imposes “procedural protections. . .[that ensure] in the making of substantive choices the 
decision process will be open to all on something approaching an equal basis, with the decision-
makers held to a duty to take into account all those who their decisions affect.”213 Ideally, this is the 
best approach if it can be implemented successfully, because, although it involves court 
intervention, ultimately substantive decisions are made by democratic actors comprised of members 
or representatives of the community.  At the same time, this approach is the most ambitious one put 
forth here. 
 Regarding the other two approaches, each has advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis 
community regulation of SCP.  The first has the advantage of being able to seek the best substantive 
results in that decisions are made by politically insulated actors.214 But this is also its biggest 
disadvantage in terms of the model put forth here because decisions are being made that affect the 
community by actors that are neither part of the community nor representative of it.215 
The second possibility is a compromise.  Although the decision-making is taking place by 
politically accountable representatives, some, but not all, of these actors will not be members or 
representatives of the community in question.  However, this latter disadvantage is the very reason 
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why this option is a possibility.216 It is only when actors who are directly accountable to the 
community act in a manner that is unfair that these three options are considered.  As such, actors 
who are politically accountable to a broader base than the community itself may serve to balance 
out the partisanship that leads to unacceptable results in cases in which decisions on the community-
level operate unfairly. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The proposed model accomplishes two things.  First, by recognizing that mass private 
property is highly location specific, it avoids a one size fits all solution that is implicit in much 
scholarship on SCP and mass private space.  Second, by asserting the primacy of the community, it 
provides a framework for reinforcing community participation in formulating fundamental policy.  
The framework does put some boundaries on community preferences.  Outer boundaries are rooted 
in property law and in the public character of the property.  Also, the model provides for alternative 
mechanisms for when the community does not act in a procedurally fair model. 
 
216 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 203, at 37 (discussing how groups that disagree on fundamental first order issues might 
nonetheless reach consensus on important outcomes). 
